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The primary purpose of this work is to define what has
so commonly been referred to as a "special relationship"
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In accomplish'
ing that task there evolved therefrom two paramount theses
The first is that there is, indeed, a special relation'
ship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the
second is that the relationship underwent a significant
change in 1973, Founded shortly after the birth of the
nation-state kingdom within a context of private economic
venture, it was a decade later before the relationship was
expanded to include bilateral government relations. The
year 1973 marked a watershed in the relationship for it
was events of that year which prompted a redistribution
of share-interests and a metamorphosis of the relationship
into something of greater complexity and intertwining of
interests
.
The method of approach is via chronological history.
The first half of this work traces the birth and evolution
of the relationship while the latter half focuses upon
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PREFACE
The primary purpose of this work is to define what has
so commonly been referred to as a "special relationship"
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In accomplish-
ing that task, there evolved therefrom two paramount theses.
The first is that there is, indeed, a special relation-
ship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The relation-
ship began approximately ten years after the founding of the
kingdom via a transnational actor. The relationship later
broadened to include a bilateral government-to-government
relationship with all its inclusive aspects; from agricultural
to military cooperation.
The second thesis derived from defining the special
relationship is that in 1973, a significant reapportionment
occurred within the balance of the relationship. The Arab-
Israeli war and the oil embargo affected the relationship
so as to both redistribute share-interests and metamorphose
it into something of greater complexity and intertwining of
interests.
The method of approach is via chronological history.
The first chapter investigates briefly the history of the
House of Saud and the nation-state Saudi Arabia. The two
are a part in each other as evidenced by the fact that
the nation-state bears the family name. Chapter II

traces the history of the relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia with a breakdown into two separate
eras -- pre-1973 and post-1973. Chapter III discusses
contemporary national interests of the two states, each in
the other, and offers contemporary evidence of expressions
of those national interests. There evolves, therefore,
from Chapter III a description of the current state of the
relationship. Chapter IV concludes the work by summarizing
how the relationship reached its present state and fore-
casting expectations of the future.
Research material for this paper includes both primary
and secondary data. While emphasis was placed upon primary
data, some authors' opinions proved especially helpful and
must, therefore, be recognized. To define the national
interest of Saudi Arabia most accurately, one requires a
Saudi Arabian perspective. Primary data with such a per-
spective is limited because of many factors including loca-
tion, uncommon language and in some cases, ambiguity in
expression. Secondary sources helped, in many cases, to
overcome the handicap of incomplete Saudi, Arab, Islamic
perspective. While area specialization can minimize such
a handicap, it can never completely eliminate it for a non-
Arab, non-Muslim.
Data sources include not only professors and facilities
of the Naval Postgraduate School but the libraries of Hoover
Institute, Stanford University, University of Chicago, and
10

personal interviews with several Middle East area specialists




I. SAUDI ARABIA: THE NATION STATE
A. THE HOUSES OF SAUD AND WAHHAB
The history of Saudi Arabia as a nation-state begins in
its most concise form in 1932. On September 18 of that year,
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud assumed the title of king and proclaimed
his domain to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, a
more extensive history must consider how the nation-state
came into being, for the foundations of authority and
legitimacy which exist in the contemporary sovereign nation-
state were begun two centuries earlier.
Such a consideration must of necessity be a family
story --a story of the House of Saud. It was through the
accomplishments of the House of Saud that divided and
separate regions, peoples and tribes were unified into a
singular, functioning nation.
Eighteenth century Arabia was for the most part a land
politically fragmented where scores of independent tribal
leaders and urban lords held small domains. More often than
not, these separate and independent leaders were in conflict,
each with the other. Mohammed ibn Saud, one of the earliest
members of the House of Saud, was one such leader, overseeing
his small domain in an area north of the present day capital,
Riyadh
.
There arose within a nearby area a religious leader,
Mohammed al-Wahhab. Appalled by what he saw as sacreligious
12

and idolatrous practices, Al-Wahhab called for a return to
the original principles of Islam. Stirring up both fervent
following and violent opposition, he was forced by the oppo-
sition to leave his home and to seek refuge elsewhere.
Forced out of his own region, Mohammed al-Wahhab sought
and was granted refuge by Mohammed ibn Saud. The religious
leader and the tribal leader shared the same ideology and
saw, through their unification, the furtherance of the
same. In 1744, they swore a joint oath to support and
further their common cause both within and without the realm
of Mohammed ibn Saud.^ Thus was born what was eventually
to become the monarchy of the House of Saud.
The combination of Saud's tribal militancy and Wahhab
messianic ideology made for a fervent force which was to
eventually transform the Arabian Peninsula from a region of
separate and warring tribes and regions into a unified
kingdom.^ The House of Saud and the Wahhabi religious
conservatism were further united by inter-marriage between
the two families, the most important of which was Saud's
to the daughter of al-Wahhab.^ In 1788 with the House of
Saud family concurrence, Mohammed al-Wahhab designated the
rule of succession which was to continue into the twentieth
century. Saud's eldest son was designated as Wall al-Ahd
,
Holder of the Covenant or Heir Apparent. Instructions then
went out throughout the realm for the traditional baiah
13

or pledge o£ allegiance to be sworn to Saud. This remains
to be the procedure of the Saudi monarchy today. As George
Rentz points out, the often heard reference to the Heir
Apparent as Crown Prince is inaccurate for there is no
crown prince in Saudi Arabia.** Mohammed al-Wahhab died in
1792 but the Wahhabi conservatism ideology lived on to
be practiced by the House of Saud and to be the foundation
of Saudi Arabian society today.
The period subsequent to al-Wahhab 's death up to the
beginning of the twentieth century was a period of both
victory and set-back for the House of Saud. At one point
in the early nineteenth century, the House of Saud combined
with Wahhabi ideology had expanded its realm to include
most of the Arabian Peninsula and was approaching Damascus.
However, the Ottoman Sultan, having already been humiliated
by his loss of the Holy Cities Mecca and Medina, decided
that the limit had been reached. The Sultan commissioned
his Egyption viceroy, Mohammed Ali, to send an expedition to
the peninsula to regain both his territory and his honor.
There followed a series of campaigns between the House of
Saud and both Mohammed Ali and other tribes that lasted
until 1891. In that year, the House of Saud, weakened by
both external and internal strife, lost even its homeland,
the central province of Nejd. A rival tribe, the Rashids
,




B. RISE OF THE NATION STATE
In January 1902, the eldest son of the exiled House o£
Saud left Kuwait and returned to Riyadh. In a daring dawn
raid with less than fifty men, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud (commonly
known in the West as Ibn Saud) reconquered Riyadh from the
Rashids. Thus began the consolidation of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia as it is known today. And thus at the age of
21 began the rise of King Ibn Saud, the founder of the
contemporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and father of the
present king.
The consolidation was accomplished in a step-by-step
process from the central province, the Nejd, to the eastern
provinces, then the southwestern-most province, the Asir;
and finally the western-most province, the Hejaz.
Ibn Saud's 1913 movement toward conquering the eastern
provinces was to have special significance in al-Ahsa.
Whereas past conquests had been more of familial basis,
primarily Saud versus Rashid, the move toward al-Ahsa was
against a foreign power. Al-Ahsa was a Turkish garrison
manned by Turkish troops. And while Rashid and Hussein
were both indirectly supported by the Ottomans, the conflict
at al-Ahsa was Saud's first direct confrontation with the
Turks. Saud had also heretofore placed primary dependence
for his manpower requirements upon temporary alliances.
But such assistance was usually inversely proportional
15

to the difficulty of the ensuing struggle. It was herein
then that the evolution of the Ikhwan began.
^
In terms of difficulty and primordial significance, the
Hejaz was predominant. For it was here that Hussein, the
great grandfather of the present King Hussein of Jordan,
reigned supported by the British. British subsidies to both
rulers could not quell the rivalry between them and in 1926
the Saudi -Wahhabi movement took control of the Hejaz,
Hussein went into exile in Cyprus and Ibn Saud was declared
the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of the Nejd and Dependencies.
After a further period of consolidation, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud
declared his realm on September 18, 1932, to be called the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Those foundations of legitimacy and authority which
enabled Ibn Saud to consolidate the Arabian Peninsula into
a unified kingdom continue to this day to be pillars of the
Saudi state. Starting with the single source of tribal
leadership, the Saud family had expanded by taking up the
Wahhabi religious ideology and cemented that consolidation
by intermarriage with the Wahhabs. Ibn Saud used the same
technique. As he conquered or consolidated additional tribes
or regions, rivalries were erased and bonds established by
marrying leading daughters of conquered tribes and religious
leaders (ulema) , thus giving everyone a vested interest in
the furtherance of the House of Saud.^ Ibn Saud's marriages
16

left more than 30 living sons. "Rather than mere procreation
it was creative kingdom building."® Furthermore, the ideology
of Wahhabism made individual tribesmen brothers in a greater
community, the community of Wahhabist Islam. Thus in 1932,
Ibn Saud had established the suprastructure upon which his
successors would claim rulership of Saudi Arabia, As king
he was the chief ruler within the state; as head of the
Wahhabist movement he was the central religious figure; as
leader of the House of Saud, he was the leading tribal
chief of all tribes; and as protector of Islam's holiest
shrines, Mecca and Medina, his kingdom occupied a position
of prominance throughout the entire Islamic world.
^
C. TOWARD A MODERN STATE
With his nation-state newly consolidated Ibn Saud had to
turn and face conflict from an adjoining state. A border
dispute developed in 1933 between his southeastern province,
Asir, and the state of Yemen. With Imam Yehya of Yemen
provoking what had originally started as a challenge of
rulership within the Asir, King Ibn Saud decided to strike
at the root of the problem. War was declared on Yemen in
March 1934, and Ibn Saud sent his two eldest sons to lead
an invasion force. The counterattack was successful and the
Imam sued for peace with Ibn Saud's forces commanding a
large portion of Yemen. A treaty was signed on June 23, 1934,
wherein Ibn Saud demanded neither reparations nor territorial
17

changes of any sort. The statesmanship of Ibn Saud impressed
the Imam Yehya in such a manner that he thereafter did his
best to refrain from hostile actions against Ibn Saud.^°
Border relations with neighboring states were further improved
on April 2, 1936, when a treaty of Arab brotherhood and non-
aggression was signed with the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq.^^
With his state fully expanded and affairs with neighboring
states in a peaceful mode, Ibn Saud could demobilize his war
machine and devote primary attention to development of a
nation-state infrastructure. Ministries of foreign affairs
and finance were established by 1932 and provincial governors
were appointed in the provinces of Nejd, Hejaz, Ahsa, and
Asir. Internal development proceeded slowly. Social services
were initiated, experimental agricultural projects were
established, and the state began to acquire the paraphernalia
necessary to function as a nation-state.
The need for finance to maintain the state was the
catalyst which prompted sale of an oil concession to an
American firm in 1933. Oil in commercial quantity was
discovered in 1938, thus seemingly ensuring financial sol-
vency for King Ibn Saud's kingdom. However, World War II
delayed development of production and export facilities and
it was not until the late 1940s that the kingdom was able





During World War II, King Ibn Saud kept his kingdom
neutral. ^^ He did, however, approve an agreement with the
U.S. for airfield basing rights in Saudi Arabia. However,
construction was not completed until after the war and both
negotiations and construction were played down in order to
avoid public infringement of his declared neutrality. As
the war ended, Saudi Arabia declared war on Germany on
March 1, 1945, thus allowing participation in the United
Nations Conference at San Francisco. ^^
The increasing income from oil development subsequent
to the war allowed for increased internal development. Annual
revenue had changed from $4 million in 1944 to $85 million
in 1945.^** Transportation, power generation, education,
agriculture, health care and water supply all benefited from
the development funds. The kingdom experienced significant
progress in regard to technology but governmental leadership
remained very much patriarchal.
The government was the House of Saud. Ibn Saud was a
monarch guided not by any sort of constitution (as defined
by Western standards) but by Islamic law. Positions of
leadership and responsibility were filled by members of the
royal family or close confidents. His sons Saud and Faisal
served as viceroys of the two most important provinces,
Nejd and Hejaz. Saud was heir-apparent and commander of
the army; Faisal was foreign minister. A council of
19

ministers was established in October 1953 to advise the monarch
but its makeup was predominantly royal family.
King Ibn Saud died November 9, 1953, and was succeeded
by his eldest son, Saud. While there had been significant
development under Ibn Saud, this was not his most significant
accomplishment. His most significant accomplishment was the
feat of more than two decades prior to his death. Ibn Saud
had unified a vast area of conflicting tribal regions into a
nation-state. Moreover, he had maintained that unity for
nearly a quarter of a century. Such an accomplishment
required a tremendous skill in maintaining a delicate balance.
On the one hand he faced the fervent, often labeled fanatical,
conservatism of the Wahhabi Ikhwan whose "fanaticism" had
served him so well in military campaigns. On the other hand
there existed the relatively liberal, almost secular,
views which existed in peoples such as those in the Hejaz.^^
King Ibn Saud had for a quarter of a century walked that
tightrope without being drawn off-balance by either faction;
thus ensuring continued unity of his new-found kingdom.
The demands of the kingdom were not so well met by
Ibn Saud's successor, Saud. From within the kingdom there
developed a dissatisfaction over alleged wasteful expendi-
tures and a lack of development. From without, there
developed the challenge of Nasserism, originating in the
Egyptian revolution of 195 2 and spreading throughout the
20

Arab world. Problems reached crisis stage in March 1958,
and King Saud decreed his brother and Heir Apparent Faisal
would assume full powers of government in the fields of
internal, foreign, and fiscal policy. Under Faisal, fiscal
policy was greatly improved and the nation's debts were
significantly liquidated. But Faisal's strict program of
austerity was not without criticism, especially from Saud's
patriarchal faction. Resultingly, there developed a power
struggle for leadership of the kingdom which was not fully
resolved until November 2, 1964.^^ In the period 1958-1964
there occurred several transfers of power between Saud and
Faisal, with Saud always retaining the title of king and
Faisal dutifully relinquishing control whenever challenged
by his brother and king, Saud.
Faisal's last submission was March 15, 1962.^^ King
Saud reassumed power and Faisal left the country shortly
thereafter for the United States. His departure was partly
to undergo medical treatment in the United States and partly
to express dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in
Saudi Arabia. Within a few months, however, he was per-
suaded to return and reassume government leadership. The
September 2 revolution in Yemen had precipitated another
crisis for Saudi Arabia requiring Faisal's expertise.
Faisal continued de facto leadership of the kingdom from




of power. On this occasion, however, there evolved a
consensus from all the sources of power within the kingdom,
the ulema , the council of royal princes, and the tribal
sheikhs: Saud's challenge was rejected. King Saud was
formally deposed and Heir Apparent Faisal was proclaimed
King on November 2, 1964.^®
Under Faisal's leadership, the country underwent
significant development while still adhering to the
traditional principles of Wahhabi Islam. He had introduced
a ten-point program of modernization in 1962 which included
judicial reform, education, health and social development,
and propagation of the Islamic faith. ^^ In Arab affairs,
the country began to assume greater authority by financing
rehabilitation of "front-line" Arab states after the 1967
war. After Nasser's death in 1970, King Faisal emerged
as the leading spokesman for the Arab world.
Under Faisal's leadership the first two five-year
development plans were drawn up. The first in 1970 called
for development expenditure of $9.2 billion and the second
in 1975 called for $142 billion. ^^
In international affairs, the increased revenues result-
ing from quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 literally
skyrocketed the kingdom up the list of international protocol,
Saudi Arabian crude increased from $3.01 to $11.65 per
barrel and the kingdom's oil revenues rose from $4.34 billion
22

in 1973 to $22.6 billion in 1974.^^ Balance -of-payment
surpluses rose by a factor of ten -- from $2.5 billion in
1973 to $25 billion in 1974.^^ Moreover, the kingdom's
possessions of the world's largest proven reserves -- 25%
of free world total -- and production of 8.5 million barrels
per day -- again 251 of free world total -- gave it over-
whelming status in a world economy frightened by energy
prospects. ^ ^
In development of the country, propagation of Islam
and the Arab cause, and emergence of the nation as an inter-
national actor of significance. King Faisal was approaching
a position of historical significance equal to that of his
father, Ibn Saud. It was then a tragic occurrence that on
March 25, 1975, he was assassinated by a young nephew.^**
The Heir Apparent, Khalid, Faisal's brother, assumed
the monarchy and his half-brother Fahd assumed the position
of Heir Apparent and first deputy Prime Minister. The position
of head of the National Guard was assumed by Prince Abdullah
while Prince Sultan retained the Ministry of Defense and
Aviation. As first deupty Prime Minister, Prince Fahd has
conducted most of the day-to-day affairs of the kingdom for
King Khalid is troubled with medical problems. However,
there is no doubt that the loyalty is with King Khalid and
he retains full authority as king.
King Khalid has carried on in much the same way as
Faisal had reoriented the kingdom. Just as Ibn Saud and
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Faisal had before him, Khalid had been required to strike
a finely tuned balance between Islamic traditionalism and
modernization. The most recent emanation of this policy
of balance was evidenced by expansion of governmental bureau-
cracy, under demands of the expanding technocratic class,
to include urban middle class. Such a move not only met
demand but broadened the regime's power base. The most
significant of such movements occurred in October 1975
when the Council of Ministers membership was expanded from
fourteen members to twenty. Whereas the council began with
a majority of members being royal princes, its makeup
changed to include only eight royal princes. Eleven of the
new members had higher degrees, one had a bachelor's degree
and two were prominent Islamic theologians.^^ The dynamicism
of the oil economy and traditionalism of the Islamic society
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II. THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA :
EVOLUTION OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
The United States -Saudi Arabian relationship evolved
through many steps. The foundation of the relationship was
established just one year after Ibn Saud declared his newly
consolidated realm to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And
from that basis of private economic interests, the relation-
ship broadened to include national interests of oil, geostra-
tegic, military, political and economic interests. Each of
these factors remains today as important sustainers of the
relationship. For there has been both constant growth in
depth within each individual factor and lateral growth of the
total relationship by encompassment of additional factors.
The year 1973 marked a watershed in evolution of the
relationship. It was in that year that the junior member of
the bilateral relationship exercised fully independent actions
to the detriment of the senior member. The results of that
action so affected and impressed the United States and its
interests, both at home and abroad, that the relationship
thereafter would be on a revised basis. Many of the old
bases for the relationship would continue but the partner-
ship would be on revised share interest proportions. Saudi
Arabia had proven in a most dramatic manner that it would
jeopardize its interests in the partnership in favor of
regional concerns and interests. While many events of the
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past had focused the attention of the policy-making elite
upon the importance of Saudi Arabia, no event had ever been
so impressionary in both scope of reach and effect. Saudi
Arabia gained world notoriety in both its importance to
free-world interests and its ability to jeopardize those
interests in favor of more nationalistic interests. The
United States -Saudi Arabian relationship was to be thereafter
both on a more even footing and intertwined complexity. In
following the evolution of the relationship, this chapter
will then approach the topic via two separate eras -- pre-1973
and post-1973.
A. PRE-1973
The genesis of the United States -Saudi Arabian relation-
ship was in the form of private economic enterprise -- economic
enterprise between a tribal chieftain whose new-found conquests
required financing and a private oil company which was willing
to risk advancing the required financing in exchange for
exploration rights. King Ibn Saud quickly found that the
financial requirements of his newly formed state exceeded those
revenues provided by the kingdom's primary source of revenue --
the annual pilgrimage to Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and
Medina. An oil concession was a possible source of revenue and
oil had been already discovered in neighboring Bahrain; thus
there were a few private oil companies mildly interested in
exploring the kingdom for petroleum resources.
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As early as 1923, before complete consolidation of his
kingdom, Ibn Saud had granted oil exploration rights to the
Eastern General Syndicate of London. There was much opposi-
tion to such a move, especially from the religious leaders --
the ulema . They feared the infidel influence which would
accompany outsiders drawn to the kingdom by oil. Undoubtedly,
Ibn Saud shared some of that fear but his movement required
funding and the sum of <j£2000 annual concession rental fees
provided sorely needed income. However, Eastern General
lost interest after two unsuccessful seasons of exploration
and the concession was formally terminated in 1928.^
The depression of the 1930s impacted the kingdom's meager
revenues severely. Pilgrims to Mecca and Medina decreased
from over 130,000 in 1927 to 40,000 in 1931.^ Further, Ibn
Saud's realm had now expanded to include all of contemporary
Saudi Arabia. And he was involved in a costly dispute on the
border with Yemen which would eventually lead to war. Thus,
with increasing fiscal demands of an emerging nation-state
escalating drastically while income decreased (from what was
a meager amount to start with) Ibn Saud was forced to look
outward for assistance and to relegate any fears of outside
influence which his Wahhabi conservatism might suggest.
H. St. John Philby, a former British army officer con-
verted to Islam, played an important role in the United States'
entrance upon the scene. Philby spent the last forty years
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of his life in Arabia and was accepted in Ibn Saud's tent
as confidant and advisor.^ Upon Philby's advice, Ibn Saud
met in 1931 with the American philanthropist, Charles Crane,
who had represented the United States President Wilson a
decade earlier in the King-Crane Commission to the Middle
East. Crane was sponsoring development work in Yemen and
Ibn Saud asked for his assistance in assessing mineral and
water development potential within his kingdom. The experi-
ence with the Eastern Syndicate concession had raised doubts
about oil resources and emphasis was now to be on water and
possibly gold. Crane agreed to employ at his own expense
an American mining engineer, Karl Twitchell, to survey the
kingdom. Twitchell completed his survey and returned to
New York in 1932 whereupon Crane authorized him to make known
his results to any interested company. Twitchell 's survey
still rated oil as the greatest mineral potential of Saudi
Arabia. Only one company expressed any interest. Standard
Oil of California (Socal) . Socal had found oil in neighboring
Bahrain in June 1932; thus, there was some hope of realiza-
tion of Twitchell 's reports.
Twitchell returned to Saudi Arabia with a senior Socal
executive and in May 1933 in Jidda, Socal signed a sixty-year
oil concession with King Ibn Saud for the variously disputed
sum of 35 to 50 thousand gold sovereigns.**
In 1936, Texaco joined in partnership with Socal in the
Saudi venture to afford the benefit of Texaco 's worldwide
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marketing facilities. Together the two companies formed the
basis of what would later be known as the Arabian American
Oil Company (Aramco) . They were later joined by Mobil Oil
Company and Exxon Oil Company, thus completing the American
consortium membership. Oil was not discovered in quantity
until 1938 but that discovery was cause for renegotiation of
the sixty-year concession. Payments were substantially
higher and the concession period was extended to 1999.
Just as the concession was being renegotiated in 1939,
competition appeared in the form of a Japanese offer. The
Japanese offer had been transmitted by the Italian Minister
to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the German Minister to
Iraq who was also accredited to Saudi Arabia called in
Jidda to further the drama. Twitchell asserts that the offer
was so "fantastic" that Aramco had to admit that, for its
part, such terms were not commercially practicable and that
Aramco could not match such an offer. ^ Tempting or not.
King Ibn Saud chose to continue dealing with his American
friends, thus leaving the Japanese and the Germans empty-
handed. The United States still had no political interests
in Saudi Arabia -- there was no U.S. diplomatic representation
accredited to the country at the time -- thus it is felt that
this was Ibn Saud's prime consideration. The Japanese and
German offers could incur political associations while the
Aramco association offered no such liability.
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Adhering to his policy of non- involvement , King Ibn Saud
steered his kingdom on a course of neutralism in the rising
political storm which was to be World War II. However, in
spite of his neutralism, the kingdom was to suffer from the
war. Revenue from the new found life blood of petroleum
exports was vastly curtailed as markets assumed the polarity
of Allied or Axis camp. Tankers could no longer venture the
long trip between the Persian Gulf and market and war priori-
ties on strategic materials such as steel curtailed Aramco
development. Also, the kingdom's final, basic source of
revenue -- the pilgrimage traffic -- was vastly curtailed by
the war. King Ibn Saud was again in dire fiscal straits.
He appealed to Aramco, the United States and Great
Britain for assistance. Aramco advanced a loan of three
million dollars in 1940.^ However, this was only half of
what Ibn Saud felt his country needed. With obvious concern
for the future of its operation in Saudi Arabia, an Aramco
representative, James A. Moffett, met with the Roosevelt
administration in April 1941 in an attempt to secure United
States aid for the king. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
prepared a memorandum for President Roosevelt relaying Mr.
Moffett 's concern that "unless King Ibn Saud receives financial
assistance at once there is grave danger that the independent
Arab Kingdom cannot survive the present emergency...."^
Lacking legislative authority for such an action. President
Roosevelt collaborated with Britain to funnel financial
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assistance to Saudi Arabia by way of funds made available to
Britain through American Lend-Lease Assistance.® Thus was
established the precedent of United States economic aid to
Saudi Arabia.
Exactly ten years after the birth of the relationship in
1933 between the United States and Saudi Arabia by way of an
American oil consortium concession, the relationship was to
take on more official overtones. In February 1943, President
Roosevelt's declaration that "the defense of Saudi Arabia is
vital to the defense of the United States" was a catalyst for
a chain of events which would make 1943 a year of special
significance in the evolution of United States-Saudi Arabian
government relations.^ The primary reason for the declaration
was to enable direct lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia, thus
avoiding the indirect method through Britain which had
existed for the past two years. The growing Aramco operation
had relayed to U.S. policy makers a perception of U.S.
strategic interest in Saudi Arabia. Resultingly, American
diplomatic representation in Jidda was raised in rank in July
from charge to minister, an agreement was made in December for
airfield construction at Dhahran and a U.S. mission arrived
in July to determine Saudi Arabian requirements for military
assistance. -^ °
Dhahran airbase was to be the initial physical evidence
of United States government expression of military interests
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in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it represented a significant
step in the gradual change in paramount foreign influence in
the country from British to American. Located on the eastern
coast of Saudi Arabia, Dhahran represented a logical site
for an airbase linking Southern Asia with the Western World.
It also represented a position of strategic importance in
executing the Pacific war effort which was to continue after
the war in Europe. And as the headquarters for Aramco
operations in Saudi Arabia, the location would support allied
oil interests in the country. The significance of such a
project in diminishing British influence in the area with
resultant increase in American influence was not lost to the
British, however, for the American minister in Saudi Arabia
reported that the British had engaged in "anti-American
coercion of the Saudi Government" in an attempt to effect
Saudi Arabian rejection of the American project. The British
yielded, however, after the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull protested to the British Government characterizing their
opposition as a "reversion to dog-eat-dog policy which, if
continued, has possibilities we are not presently able to
apprise. "^^ In late 1943, an agreement was reached between
the U.S. Legation in Jidda and the government of Saudi
Arabia wherein the U.S. was allowed to construct an air-
base at Dhahran in exchange for U.S. assistance in training
the Saudi military. ^^ Negotiations were carried out without
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public notices in an attempt to avoid discreditation of King
Ibn Saud's avowed neutrality. Construction began at Dhahran
in 1944 and was completed in 1946.
The July 1943 U.S. military mission to Saudi Arabia
represented another manifestation of more active pursuit of
U.S. interests in the country. Secretary of State Hull
ordered the newly appointed minister to Saudi Arabia to inform
King Ibn Saud and British representation in Saudi Arabia
that Saudi Arabia and the United States would deal, henceforth,
directly with each other in matters regarding arms transfers
and not through the British as intermediary as had been the
custom heretofore. And the United States further informed
the British government that the U.S- believed that its con-
tribution to King Ibn Saud's military needs should at least
equal that of Great Britain's. ^^ The mission was followed
in the fall of the same year by a visit to the U.S. by Prince
Faisal in negotiations for U.S. arms aid. The February 1944
grant to Saudi Arabia of a seven million riyal Lend-Lease
package represented then the culmination of those significant
inroads which had been made in 1943.
The war prompted a view of Saudi Arabia as something more
than an area wherein U.S. commercial interests were involved.
What Aramco had started as a private commercial interest had
developed to include both diplomatic and military ties. Thus,
it is not surprising that President Roosevelt wished to meet
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the leader of the tribal kingdom. Indeed, Roosevelt's image
of the great King had been sparked many years earlier by
people such as Charles Crane, Karl Twitchell and Lowell
Thomas, and by the American press. Roosevelt may have con-
sidered Ibn Saud as a fellow man of his time, like himself
and Churchill. ^ **
In February 1945 while returning from Yalta, President
Roosevelt met King Ibn Saud aboard the American cruiser
U.S.S. Quincy in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez.-^^ Subsequent
to their meeting, Roosevelt sent Ibn Saud a personal letter
referring to the "memorable conversation we had not so long
ago" and restating his promise that there would be no United
States action in regard to the question of Palestine "with-
out full consultation of both Arabs and Jews."^^ It was also
as a result of the meeting with Ibn Saud that Roosevelt
remarked to Congress, "Of the problems with Arabia, I learned
more about the whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish
problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I
could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters. "^^
Two months later, Roosevelt was dead and Harry Truman
succeeded him. A year later, in 1946, there occurred an
open tension between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the
root cause of which was to continue as a source of conflict
between the two nations, however great and vast their other
shared interests. The end of the war brought the question of
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Palestine and the Jewish refugees to a peak. President
Truman made a public appeal for the admission of 100,000
Jews to Palestine. Obviously offended, Ibn Saud sent
President Truman a letter which was made public, recalling
President Roosevelt's promise of no decisions without Arab
and Jewish consultation.^^ Within a few months, however,
in February 1947, King Ibn Saud and his son, the Heir
Apparent Saud, were in the United States visiting President
Truman. During the visit. President Truman presented both
King Ibn Saud and the Heir Apparent with Legion of Merit
commendations for "support and encouragement to the cause
of the Allies" during World War 11.^^
Any appeasement of the Saudis, however, whether intended
or not, was rather short-lived. For United States de facto
recognition of a Jewish State in May 1948 prompted strong
reaction from Saudi Arabia. The American minister to Saudi
Arabia, J. Rives Childs, forwarded to the Secretary of State
a forecast of a possible Saudi break in relations with the
United States. Further, he provided a rather bleak assess-
ment of a situation with so many ominous possibilities that
he was requesting the Consulate in Dhahran to confer with
U.S. military authorities at Dhahran with a "view to per-
fecting without delay plans of evacuation. ... "^ ° Although
the situation never developed to the extent of Childs*
worst fears, Malcolm Peck reports that Faisal, who was then
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Foreign Minister, told Childs that he would have broken
relations with the United States had he been in a position
to do so.^^ The Jewish state issue effected a thorn into
the U.S. -Saudi relationship but other policy formulations of
the era were to serve to strengthen it.
The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, war in Korea, and
American and European rearmament were all issues of the era
serving to strengthen the evolving United States-Saudi
Arabian relationship via oil. The post-World War II oil
shortage scare, like that of post-World War I and that of
a future era, served to emphasize the importance of Saudi
Arabian oil. Oil exports from the United States to Europe
decreased after the war and in 1948 the United States became,
for the first time, a net importer of crude oil. Saudi
Arabia's rapidly increasing production and proven reserves
paralleled the increasing needs of the free world. Saudi
Arabian crude production increased from less than one-half
million barrels in 1938 to nearly eight million in 1944,
over 21 million in 1945, and about 200 million barrels by
1950.22 By 1951, Middle Eastern oil was to supply 80% of
the European Economic Recovery Plan needs, thus inextricably
intertwining U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia via its Atlantic
Pact allies. 2 3 it was then in support of these interests
that within the era the U.S. Legation in Jidda was expanded to
full Embassy status in 1949; the agreement covering the Dhahran
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airbase was renegotiated in 1951, allowing U.S. access for
a long-term basis (five years) ; and concurrently with the
Dhahran agreement there evolved a Mutual Defense Assistance
Program whereby Saudi Arabia became the first Arab state
to be designated, by the United States, as a nation whose
ability to defend itself was deemed important to the United
States.^"*
In 1957, there was great American concern over the inroads
that Russia had made into the Middle East after the Suez War.
As Lenczowski observed, 1955 was the watershed regarding
Soviet relations with the Middle East. For it was in that
year that they began rapprochement with non-communist
governments in the area by offering economic, technical and
military aid.^^ As a countermove, President Eisenhower
proclaimed, in January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine as
both a warning to the Soviets and an offer of aid, both economic
and military, to any Middle Eastern state which requested it.
Within a few weeks. King Saud was in Washington visiting
President Eisenhower. This was Saud's first official visit
to the U.S. since his father's death in November 1953 and
his assumption of the title of King. After the meeting a
joint comminique was issued wherein Saud spoke of the
purpose of his visit as "to continue close cooperation with
the United States" and Eisenhower spoke, regarding military
defense of Saudi Arabia, of his assurance to King Saud of
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the willingness of the United States to "provide assistance
for the strengthening of the Saudi Arabian armed forces. "^^
King Saud returned to his country with a $180 million increase
in American economic and military aid to expand training
programs for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force, and
to improve Saudi civil aviation facilities. In return, the
U.S. was granted another five-year basing right agreement on
the Dhahran airbase.^^
However, that was to be the last agreement on Dhahran
basing rights. For on March 19, 1961, the Saudi government
announced that the agreement would not be renewed upon its
official expiration on April 2, 1962. The perception of
foreign military forces upon Arabian soil had become too much
of a liability relative to both domestic and inter-Arab
nationalist sentiment.
In the summer of 1962, King Saud's brother, the Heir
Apparent Faisal, came to the United States. Officially, the
trip was to undergo medical examinations but there is reason
to believe that his exodus was also an expression of dissatis-
faction with the state of government in Saudi Arabia. In
September 1962, while Faisal was still in the United States,
the monarchy in Yemen was overthrown by a military coup
d'etat . There followed a civil war between forces loyal to
the royalists and those loyal to the cause of the revolution.
Within a month. President Nasser of Egypt had sent Egyptian
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troops in support of the revolutionary forces. Thus Saudi
Arabia now not only faced the fiscal and economic problems
of King Saud's regime but the government also faced a crisis
situation involving foreign intervention in a border state.
Thus in October, Prince Faisal was persuaded to return to the
Kingdom with the understanding that he would again be given
free rein of government.
Upon Faisal's resumption of governmental control.
President Kennedy sent a personal letter to Faisal dated
October 25, 1962, wherein he recalled their White House
discussion of three weeks prior and stated that he wanted
it "understood clearly, that Saudi Arabia can depend upon
the friendship and cooperation of the United States in
dealing with the many tasks which lie before it in the days
ahead." Further, President Kennedy assured Faisal of the
U.S. support for "maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity."^®
Shortly thereafter, U.S. resolve in supporting Saudi
Arabian territorial integrity was given opportunity for
demonstration. In November 1962, Egyptian aircraft bombed
Saudi territory adjacent to the border with Yemen as an act
of retribution for Saudi support of royalist forces. The
United States State Department issued a public statement
deploring the incidents and making known U.S. "interest in the
preservation of [Saudi Arabian] integrity. "^^ A squadron
of United States fighter aircraft was deployed to Saudi
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Arabia as both a demonstration of U.S. resolve to Saudi
Arabia and as a deterrent against further Egyptian bombings.
In 1965, there evolved another linkage in the United
States-Saudi Arabian relationship which continues today,
representing to both countries one of the most important of
linkages. The Unites States Army Corps of Engineers' involve-
ment in developing Saudi Arabian infrastructure has "no
comparable program elsewhere abroad, neither in scope or
context."^" The Saudi Arabians' admiration of the quality
of construction in the Dhahran airfield and terminal which
had been turned over to them in 1962 prompted queries of
further Corps involvement in Saudi Arabian nation-building.
Thus in 1965, a country-to-country agreement was concluded
between the U.S. Department of State and Saudi Arabian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereby the Corps of Engineers
would be consultant, planner, administrator and general
overseer for military construction within Saudi Arabia.
Costs are fully reimbursed by Saudi Arabia. The agreement
has been extended three times with the consent of both govern-
ments: 1970, 1975 and 1978. As will be seen in a following
section, the program remains one of the most visible, compre-
hensive and important of linkages in the U.S. -Saudi Arabian
relationship.
With the struggle over Saudi Arabian political leadership
permanently resolved in 1964, Faisal made his first official
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visit the United States as King in June 1966. After
visiting President Johnson, a rather non-impressive joint
statement was issued wherein both "noted with approval the
close and cordial relations which have long existed" between
the two countries. However, the lack of any other substantive
statements combined with the diplomatic colloquialism
referring to "frank and comprehensive exchange of views"
may suggest that all was not harmonious accord between
these two leaders. ^^
During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, United States-Saudi
Arabian relations again became strained over U.S. policy
regarding Israel. King Faisal placed an embargo on oil
shipments to the United States although its consequences
were far less than a similar action would be later in 1973.
The United States was, in 1967, parctically invulnerable to
a Saudi Arabian oil embargo. Only 19% of American oil
consumption consisted of imports and only 2.5% came from
Saudi Arabia. The United States' short-fall was made up
through imports from Iran and Venezuela, and utilization
of an internal spare production capacity of four million
barrels per day.^^ Saudi Arabia abandoned their boycott
within a month of implementation, thus allowing the incident
to pass without significant effect upon the United States-
Saudi Arabian relationship.
In May 1971, King Faisal visited President Nixon and in turn
President Nixon visited King Faisal in Riyadh in July 1974.
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In 1972, Saudi Arabia made a bid for strengthening the
relationship. In an address to the Middle East Institute in
Washington on September 30, 1972, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister
Sheikh Yamani , called for "a commercial oil agreement between
the two countries that would give Saudi Arabian oil a special
place in this [Unites States] country. "^^ The proposed
agreement would have exempted Saudi Arabian oil from import
restrictions and duties, and encouraged Saudi Arabian capital
investment in the United States. The United States would have
had first call on Saudi Arabian oil, apparently even at the
expense of Europe and Japan.
There were inherent advantages for both countries. United
States advantages would have included recycling of the growing
American dollars being spent for oil imports and interdependency
which would have diminished the possibility of interruptions
of crude supplies to the country. Saudi Arabian advantages
would have included a stable market for its increasing oil
production and opportunity for safe, profitable investment
for the revenues accrued therefrom. Saudi Arabian investment
interests were mainly in the downstream facilities of oil
production such as refineries, chemical plants and possibly
even a share in the owners of Aramco-Exxon, Texaco, Mobil
and Standard of California. United States' oil imports were
then being "conservatively estimated to reach 12mmpbd by 1980"
and Saudi Arabia was planning for a production capacity of
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ZOmmbpd by the same time period.^'* The two escalating factors
would then be mutually supportive.
The motivation for such an offer by Saudi Arabia was felt
to be a fear that the United States would, in tackling its
energy problems, "enter into arrangements with western
hemisphere producers which would discriminate against Arab
countries. "^ ^ Saudi Arabia was concerned with the tendency
to regard the Middle East as a volatile, basically anti-
Western area. She was thus attempting to assure a future
place for herself in the world oil market and economy.
However, the proposal never reached a state of development
beyond just that --a proposal. United States Department of
State officials initially categorized the proposal as
"interesting" but there was also speculation that such an
agreement would signify "a new relationship with the United
States. "^^ In the end, the complexity and delicacy of such
an agreement and the possible effect upon United States oil
relations with other countries made the proposal untimely
in the United States perspective.
Time moves quickly, however. Just one year later, on
September 27, 1973, United States Acting Treasury Secretary
William Simon was proposing to the Saudi Arabian Minister
of State, Mr. Hisham Nazer, "an economic partnership between
the United States and Saudi Arabia to ensure a continuing
flow of oil to America. "^^ Between Sheikh Yamani's 1972
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proposal and the 19 73 proposal of the United States Treasury-
Secretary, the United States had lifted oil import quotas
in an effort to meet the country's rising energy demands with
cheap Middle Eastern oil. The United States expected its
then current imports from Saudi Arabia of 365mbpd to rise
to 8.5mmbpd by 1980. ^^
However, the atmosphere had changed. Saudi Arabia now
questioned whether or not such an arrangement was in its
political interests. Political tensions between Israel and
the Arab countries were peaking and there was strong feeling
by the Arab countries that United States support of Israel
was promoting "Zionist expansionism." Thus, in one short
year, a drastic change had occurred in member perspectives
within the United States -Saudi Arabian relationship. The
United States was seeking a stronger linkage and Saudi
Arabia was avoiding one. We now know that Egyptian President
Sadat had visited with King Faisal in August 1973. Saudi
Arabia probably knew in September then that pending some
drastic development, the line for another Arab- Israeli war
would soon be drawn. ^^
B. POST-1973
In 1973 there began a series of events which were to
prompt an eventual transformation of the United States -Saudi
Arabian relationship --a transformation wherein the
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dependent member became less of a dependent and the independent
became less of an independent.
As has been seen earlier, Saudi Arabia had always been
unhappy with the United States policy toward Israel. Much
of that first contact between FDR and Ibn Saud had been taken
up with the subject of Palestine. And Truman and Ibn Saud
also had public disagreement over the matter. "^^ In 1973,
however, the objections were much more specific. The Israeli
occupation of Arab territories since the 1967 war and the
Palestinian problem were points foremost in the Arab mind.
King Faisal was becoming increasingly frustrated by
American support of what he felt to be Israeli expansionist
policies. As a leader in the world Islamic movement, he was
equally concerned about the question of Jerusalem and
frequently expressed a desire to pray in the Aqsa Mosque
as part of Arab Jerusalem. It must be remembered that his
thoughts here were concerned not only with his role as a
leader of world Islam but also his role as King of the Hejaz
and thus protector of the holy cities -- one of which is
Jerusalem.
Faisal worked diligently after July 1972 in an attempt to
convince the Nixon administration to make its Middle East
policy more "even handed." For it was in this month that
Egypt expelled her Soviet advisors. Thus Faisal argued, U.S.
support for Israel could no longer be justified by pointing
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out the Soviet influence in Egypt. By mid-1973, however,
there had been no change in U.S. policy.
In April 1973, Faisal sent Sheikh Yamani , the Saudi
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, to Washington
expressly to urge the Nixon administration to work for
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. There was
no favorable United States response. "^^ Having thus been
frustrated in every attempt to date in changing U.S. policy,
Faisal turned to that which he had avoided heretofore -- the
oil weapon. Faisal had long advocated that oil and politics
should be kept separate but now he began hints that the two
elements could be mixed.
In May 1973, at a meeting with the chief executives of
Aramco, King Faisal warned that unless there was a shift in
unqualified U.S. support of Israel, the "traditional friend-
ship for American business interest.
. .
in Saudi Arabia
will not be preserved." He added further that he expected
Aramco to use its influence to help make that change come
about. '*^
In response, Aramco effected a broad campaign to influence
American foreign policy toward the Middle East. Aramco
representatives relayed their fears to the Nixon administra-
tion but the response was summed up by Aramco in this way:
The general atmosphere was attentiveness to the message
and acknowledgement that a problem did exist but a large
degree of disbelief that any drastic action was imminent
or that any measure other than those already underway
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were needed to prevent such from beginning. The
impression was given that some believe HM [His Majesty-
King Faisal] is crying wolf when no wolf exists. '*^
U.S. military officials and congressional delegations
visiting Saudi Arabia were briefed by Aramco that whereas
it was in America's interests that Saudi Arabia continue its
high levels of production, such levels were not necessarily
always in the best interests of the Saudis. Thus, the U.S.
should avoid any polarity which would alienate Saudi opinion
by "adopting a neutral position on the Arab- Israeli dispute
and a pro-American rather than a pro- Israel policy in the
Middle East."'*'* The individual Aramco partners also approached
the American public. The New York Times carried a Mobil
advertisement which stated that "the United States must recog-
nize the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Saudis
. . . because in the last analysis we need the oil more than
Saudi Arabia will need the money. "'*^ Malcolm Peck reports
that there were two basic American responses.**^ One group
led by Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of
State George Schultz felt that the Saudis were bluffing while
another was inclined to take the threat seriously but saw
no response feasible without upsetting Israeli and United
States domestic politics. Thus, faced with the dilemma of
any response upsetting one of the two opposing factions --




Faisal was undoubtedly informed of the Aramco efforts;
however, he saw that effort, much as his own to date, as
enthusiastic and sincere but unsuccessful. Thus, when the
Egyptian President Sadat visited Riyadh in August 1973 to
relay his war plans, Faisal made a decision. Saudi Arabia
was able to use the oil weapon. Faisal reportedly told
Sadat: "Give us time, we don't want to use the oil as a
weapon in a battle which goes on for two or three days and
then stops. We want to see a battle which goes on long enough
for the world opinion to be mobilized."'*^
On October 6, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal
and penetrated the Israelis* Bar-Lav line, thus beginning the
war which no official U.S. government consensus had expected.
Israel suffered unexpected military reverses and war material
was being rapidly depleted, thus prompting the possibility
of resupply from the United States. On October 12, the four
executive officers of Aramco sent a message to Washington
urging the Nixon administration not to resupply Israel with
arms. They stressed "more than our commercial interests in
the area are now at hazard" in that Japan and Western Europe
reliance on Middle East oil was so deep that they would in
no way jeopardize their own positions. Thus, should the
United States jeopardize its own position it may result in
"Japanese, European and perhaps Russian interests largely
supplanting United States presence in the [Middle East] area
n't 8
• • • •
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However, U.S. resupply of Israel may have already begun,
for U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger reportedly told the
Israeli Ambassador to the United States on October 8 that
Israeli El Al aircraft could begin picking up supplies the
following day provided their Israeli markings were obliterated.**^
On October 13, however, all attempts at being discreet about
resupply were abandoned when the United States administration
committed itself to open resupply of Israel by launching
U.S. Air Force giant C-5 transport aircraft. On October 14,
the first C-5 arrived in Israel initiating an airbridge
capable of one thousand tons per day.^"
On October 19, President Nixon asked the U.S. Congress
to approve $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel. On
October 20, the Saudi government announced that "in view of
the increase of American military aid to Israel, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia has decided to halt all exports to the United
States of America. . ."^i While a cease fire was declared
on October 22, the embargo was not lifted until March 19,
1974.52
The United States had suffered both economically and
strategically from the embargo. During the embargo, Saudi
Arabia threatened to nationalize Aramco at "gunpoint" if the
consortium had sought to circumvent the embargo and Aramco,
realizing that the United States could not intervene, complied
fully. 5^ The embargo was so effective that the United States
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could not get Aramco oil through third party distributors.
However, the four American parent companies and three other
of the "seven sisters" pooled their worldwide resources to
mitigate the effects of the embargo.^** Non-Arab well head
production was increased and the oil companies allocated
production as equitably as possible, thus keeping shortages
in any individual country to a minimum. However, to a degree
Aramco 's forecast came true. For in resupplying Israel by
airlift, the United States was denied landing rights by all
NATO nations excepting Holland and Portugal. ^^ Thus, the
NATO nations had chosen uninterrupted Arab oil flow over allied
friendship.
While there is wide variance in subjective evaluation of
the overall effect of the embargo, there is little doubt that
it made a point. Saudi Arabia was no longer a silent,
dependent partner in the "special relationship." It could
no longer be taken for granted. Politics and economics had
propelled Saudi Arabia to a position of preeminence in the
world. The oil price had increased Saudi revenues from $4.3
I
billion in 1973 to $22.6 billion in 1974 and the gross
j
domestic product increased by over 2001 in a year. Her
possession of vast oil reserves enabled her political influ-
ence to spread throughout the world. ^^
The point had undoubtedly been made with the Nixon
administration just as it had with the world. For afterwards
53

there was intense international scrambling by individual
countries to attempt to make deals and establish institu-
tional structures to forestall such an occurrence again.
President Nixon, President Ford and Mr. Kissinger worked
both aspects -- that of the interest of the international
community and that of the interests of the United States.
In November 1973, President Nixon announced Project
Independence, an ambitious, elusive plan for U.S. energy
independence by 1980. In September 1974 in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly, President Ford spoke of
global economic interdependence and cooperation as the only
viable future approach if human survival was to be guaranteed. ^
^
Likewise in November 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger,
speaking in Chicago, called for oil-consuming nations to
conserve, search for alternate energy sources and cooperate.^®
In September 1974, as a result of U.S. initiative, the major
oil-importing countries concluded the Brussels agreement
establishing the International Energy Agency (lEA) wherein
emergency oil sharing agreement members would share oil with
any member nation boycotted in the future. ^^ And finally,
the most important outcome for this study occurred as a result
in part of bilateral discussions between U.S. Secretary of
State Kissinger and Saudi Arabian Heir Apparent Prince Fahd.
On June 8, 1974, as a result of Secretary Kissinger and
Prince Fahd's discussions, there evolved the United States-
Saudi Arabia Joint Commissions on Economic and Security
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Cooperation. Through these commissions the governments
"expressed their readiness to expand cooperation in the
fields of economics, technology, and industry, and in the
supply of the Kingdom's requirements for defensive purposes. "^°
These two commissions are formal organizational structures
which, while acknowledging interdependence between the
United States and Saudi Arabia in the fields of economics
and security, provide facilities for advancement of that
interdependence to the mutual benefit of both countries.
The United States receives for its part, in addition to oil,
a Saudi interest in the vitality of the economies of the
Western World while the Saudis receive, for their part,
technological goods and services to further their internal
development and defense.
The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and his Saudi
counterpart, the Minister of Finance and Economy serve
as co-chairmen of the economic commission while the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs and the Saudi Vice Minister of Defense serve as co-
chairmen of the security commission.
The first and most significant accomplishment of the
Joint Commission on Security was a survey conducted by the
U.S. Department of Defense, carried out at Saudi Arabian
request, on the kingdom's defense needs for the next ten years.
Resulting from that survey, there evolved a long-range plan
of order and priority for upgrading and modernization of the
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kingdom's defense structure. The plan was the most significant
and encompassing effort to date within the kingdom. It
recognized the disparity between $1.5 trillion in resources
(valued at 1976 prices) in a terrain as vast as the area
of the United States east of the Mississippi and limited
defense potential. The plan calls for maximization of the
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
From all that has gone on before one can see that there
is now a special relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia. That relationship is partly a process of
evolutionary events which started nearly a half-century ago
and partly a result of events which have occurred within the
last decade. The two nations have reached a significant
I
level of interdependence wherein there are vested national
interests each in the other.
From the Unites States perspective there is interdepen-
dence with Saudi Area in areas of: U.S. balance of payments;
stability of the dollar as the primary, singular world
currency; rate of world economic development; promotion of
U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region; promotion of U.S.
interests in the Middle East region; promotion of U.S.
interests in the Islamic world; and assistance in the U.S.
objective of an overall Arab-Israeli solution.
Similarly, from a Saudi Arabian perspective there is
interdependence with the United States in Saudi Arabian
internal and external political stability; internal
development and modernization; financial investments;
petroleum markets; and national security.
That which is perceived as national interest can be
very much a value judgment; thus there is room for wide
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interpretation. But in this chapter, the author has tried
to minimize value judgment and emphasize those national
interests which are evidenced by substance such as espoused
and enacted foreign policy, organizational structures,
commercial transactions, alliances, treaties and associations,
This chapter then details the current national interests
which sustain the United States -Saudi Arabian relationship.
That which has occurred in the past has been combined with
current evidence of substance, under the limitations pre-
viously cited, to conclude that there are five broad cate-
gories of national interests between the two countries. They
are: (1) geostrategic ; (2) oil; (3) economic; (4) political
and (5) military. It will be evident that the interests
are not always mutually shared to the same degree and in
some cases may be one-sided. However, the five categories
basically cover the most substantive sustenance of the
"special relationship."
A. GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
A former United States Ambassador to the Middle East
has noted that the very term "Middle East" does not refer
to characteristics internal to the area, but arose out of
the "relations to forces which lie beyond its borders, to
external centers of power. "^ His explanation of the term's
origin well describes the geostrategic importance of the
region relative to global security and the international
66

order. While the Middle East is the global geostrategic
focal point, Saudi Arabia is the regional geostrategic
focal point.
The Arabian Peninsula occupies a position of geostrategic
prominence in regard to: the Middle East; the Persian Gulf;
the Red Sea and Horn of Africa; several strategic waterways;
and the Arab- Israeli conflict. Comprising four-fifths of
the peninsula, Saudi Arabia is without question the dominant
power on the peninsula whether measured in land area, wealth,
or (excepting North Yemen) population.
The Middle East is located at the junction of three
continents and thus forms a strategic crossroad: a land,
air and sea bridge joining Asia, Africa and Europe. Saudi
Arabia dominates that junction both as geographic center
and as the largest single land mass within the juncture.
Closing or restricting access to those bridges would have
considerable adverse effect upon both the United States
and the free world as a whole.
The Persian Gulf represents a major source of energy for
the United States and, even more, for its European and
Japanese allies. Saudi Arabia commands the western shore
of the Gulf. To the west, Saudi Arabia commands the
eastern shore of the Red Sea and the eastern approaches to
the Horn of Africa. A significant portion of Europe's oil




Geostrategic Importance of Saudi Arabia
Source: Robert G. Irani, "U.S. Strategic Interests in Iran
and Saudi Arabia," Parameters
,
Vol. VII, No. 4, 1977, p. 253
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around the African Cape. The Red Sea route also provides
oil for the United States Mediterranean fleet.
Saudi Arabia commands the eastern shore of the Straits
of Turan -- Israel's only southern sea access. Egypt's
closure of the straits in 1967 was one precipitant of the
Arab-Israeli war of 1967.
Although Saudi Arabia is not immediately adjacent to
three other strategic waterways, its close proximity is
of strategic importance. They are the Straits of Hormuz,
the Suez Canal and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb . Over
half of the free world's oil imports, two- thirds of European
oil imports and nearly three-quarters of Japan's oil imports
traverse the Straits of Hormuz. Of direct concern to the
United States is the fact that nearly 151 of the petroleum
consumed in the United States in 1979 -- 311 of imports --
traversed the straits. Looking at U.S. allies, over 50%
of Western Europe's petroleum consumption and 70% of Japan's
petroleum consumption traversed the straits.^ And last but
certainly not least, virtually all of Saudi Arabia's export
production traverses the straits.^
The Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, like the Suez, serves as
a passageway for substantial shipping traffic between the
Mediterranean and Indian oceans. Additionally, it serves
as a route of approach for sea cargo destined for the Saudi
port of Jidda, Jordan's port of Aqaba, Israel's port of
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Elat and various other Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian
ports. Like the Suez Canal and the Strait o£ Turan,
Bab-el-Mandeb plays a potentially significant role in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Each is bounded on both sides by
Arab or Arabic speaking countries and serves as the only
passageway for the Israeli port of Elat. Ship passage
through Bab-el-Mandeb in the iiiid-1970's averaged seventy
ships per day. "*
B. OIL INTERESTS
What started as a pure economic venture for Socal and
Ibn Saud in 1933 very quickly turned into a matter of
national interests for both countries. It has already been
noted how in 1943 both diplomatic representation and financial
aid were extended to Saudi Arabia by President Roosevelt's
administration because of oil. Within seven years there
occurred another event prompted by national interests of
both countries.
As the decade of the 1950 's started, Saudi Arabia was
being paid a twenty-one cent royalty on each barrel pro-
duced while Aramco was netting $1.10 after taxes. ^ Saudi
Arabia had heard of a Venezuelan agreement whereby the
producer and government shared profits equally and began
pressing Aramco for an increased share of profits. Aramco
was, of course, highly renitent to cut its income by half.
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IThere was at the same time within United States foreign
policy a concern for the stability of conservative govern-
ments within the Arab world. Perceptions were that it would
be in the United States* national interest for such govern-
ments to be on a more sound financial basis.
There evolved out of all this a policy enactment which
solved the problems of all three participants -- the United
States Government, the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco.
The U.S. Treasury Department in the summer of 1950
agreed at the urging of the Department of State to
a system whereby companies who increase their pay-
ments to oil-producing governments would be allowed
to reduce their U.S. tax payments correspondingly.^
The result of this arrangement was to vastly increase
the financial income of the Saudi Arabian government while
reducing the taxes paid to the U.S. government by Aramco.
Another consideration was the fact that oil prices would
not have to be increased to cover the new "royalties."
Obviously, U.S. tax revenues decreased significantly --
over $50 million in the first year after the decision.^
Saudi Arabian Government revenues from Aramco increased
similarly from $39.2 million in 1949 to $111.7 million in
1950.^
The mutual interests of the United States and Saudi
Arabia were again protected in 1953 via the intermediary --
Aramco. A year earlier a National Security Council
memorandum had spoken of the interdependence of political
71

stability in the Middle East and the government incomes
derived from the rate and terms on which oil is produced.
It stated that
Since the rate and terms [oil quantity and price]
are to a large extent under the control of the
companies. . . the American oil operations are, for
all practical purposes, instruments of our foreign
policy toward these countries.^
It naturally follows then that any government attempt at
weakening those instruments would be the equivalent of self-
abatement. It is not surprising then that the Eisenhower
administration deterred a Justice Department attempt to take
antitrust action against the Aramco partners by issuing a
directive stating: "It will be assumed that the enforcement
of the antitrust laws against the Western oil companies
operating in the Near East may be deemed secondary to the
national interest. . . ."^° The continued availability of
oil was thus placed ahead of domestic legal considerations.
As an effective instrument of foreign policy, however,
Aramco had lost some of its clout and was due to lose more.
There were two root causes. One, the Tehran Pricing and
Participation Agreement of 1971 was the first of several
agreements to follow in which Saudi Arabia would assert more
and more control of prices and production. Before 1971,
their control had been minimal, especially after oil left
Saudi Arabian ports. And secondly, Saudi Arabia completed
a participation agreement with Aramco in 1972 whereby the
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Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (Petromin)
would assume a 25% share in Aramco in return for agreed upon
compensation to Aramco shareholders. However, partly as a
result of the 1973 War, the Aramco position subsequently
eroded to 40% ownership for the Aramco partners and 60%
for Petromin. As of this writing, negotiations are still
underway for 100% takeover by Petromin which will reportedly
be retroactive to January 1, 1976.^^
Although negotiations have been carried out in great
confidentiality, it is assumed that even after Petromin
assumes full ownership, the arrangement will continue to be
one wherein Aramco continues a marketing role with a certain
allocation of that which has been lifted by the company.
In 1979, Petromin took 1.3 mmbpd for direct government-to-
government sales and Aramco marketed the remainder --
8.5 mmbpd. ^^
While the policy instrument has been weakened, the
policy interest has not been so. Instead, the U.S. national
interest in Saudi Arabia has steadily increased. Likewise,
Saudi Arabia's own national interests have become of a world
order in magnitude and notoriety. The critical importance
of her status as an oil producer is now more of a fact of
life than ever before. There could be no other consequence
in a world where the gap has narrowed between energy supply
and demand. For Saudi Arabia:
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-- Possesses the world's largest proven reserves of
petroleum -- 25% of the world's total.
-- Produces approximately 20% of the free world's
total crude production.
-- Ranks along with the United States and the Soviet
Union as the top three world producers of petroleum.
-- Is the world's largest exporter of petroleum.
While her reserves presently rank as the world's largest,
the ultimate recoverable total is wrapped in vaguery and
contradiction as is the tendency for all oil producers. The
Saudi Arabian Government cited exploitable reserves in 19 77
as 153 billion barrels while Aramco cited 110 billion "proved"
and 177 billion "probable." Both calculations are probably
cautious and underestimates. Aramco stated in a 1973 memo-
randum which was subsequently published that ultimate
extraction could be as much as "245 billion barrels."^
^
In any event, using the 177 billion figure and a 10 rambpd
average production figure, one sees enough crude for 50 years. ^"^
In assessing U.S. direct interests in Saudi Arabia, the
U.S. needs continued access to Saudi oil. "Access" infers:
(1) availability of oil imports in quantities adequate to
meet United States domestic demands; (2) uninterrupted flow;
and (3) at prices which do minimal damage to the United
States economy. With 1979 imports supplying about 421
of U.S. inland oil consumption, Saudi Arabia ranks as the
leading supplier. Her contribution amounted to 17% of U.S.
imports while Nigeria ran a distant second at 14%. Figure
74

III-2 and Table III-l give a more comprehensive picture of
U.S. direct interests in Saudi Arabian oil.
Of a less direct U.S. interest is the contribution that
Saudi Arabia makes to allied oil requirements. Both Western
Europe and Japan are much more dependent on imported oil
than the United States. The United States still has today
an interest in European and Japanese access to petroleum
just as it did under the Marshall Plan. Western Europe
currently depends on imports for roughly 90% of its petroleum
requirements while Japan is totally dependent on imported
oil. Saudi Arabia is the largest single supplier to both --
over 20% of Western Europe's imports and over 30% of Japan's
imports. Figures III-2, III-4, and Tables III-2 and III-3
give a more complete picture of the linkages between Western
European, Japanese and Saudi oil.
From a Saudi perspective, oil policy presents a dilemma.
In an economy where crude production accounts for 75% of
the GNP and the majority of all government revenues, the
simplest approach would seem to be a matching of production
to revenue requirements. However, the kingdom has never
taken such a simplistic approach. Saudi oil production and
pricing are determined by many different factors, including
(1) domestic revenue requirements, (2) OPEC stability,
(3) world market stability, (4) consumer economies and (5)
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Ahmed Zaki Yamani , alluded to these factors by stating that
Saudi oil pricing and production policy is made in considera
tion of "internal development requirements and economic
circumstances in general, be they local, regional and
international . "^ ^
Domestic revenue requirements have yet to overtask oil
production income. Crude production capability combined
with crude prices have enabled Saudi budgetry balances to
steadily grow from a deficit in 1970 of $80 million to a
surplus in 1975 of $18.8 billion. One must consider also
that this balance was accrued in the face of a $41 billion
five-year development plan.^^ Thus, Saudi oil policy is
clearly not linked solely to domestic considerations. This
is not to say, however, that there are not some factions
within Saudi Arabia who think it should be so. Indeed,
there are those who argue that production should be reduced
and prices raised -- thus, they argue, maintaining current
income while extending long-term availability of their
depletable resource. The argument seems to have been
coming, in its strongest form, from the newly evolving
"Young Turk" technocratic class. To date. Sheikh Yamani
has answered their arguments with descriptions of the
kingdom's pricing and production policy typified by the
following.
If you need money to spend on development, then you
must sell oil.... For this reason, the Saudi Arabian
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Kingdom must at least produce oil to meet its develop-
ment requirements and its foreign needs. If it goes
beyond this limit -- and that is what it is doing
now -- then there must be other considerations which
necessitate its doing so. These considerations are not
necessarily purely political but both political and
economic, because a reduction in the Saudi Arabian
Kingdom's oil production will lead to an international
economic crisis which will subsequently lead to diminish-
ing our capabilities for development inside Saudi Arabia,
particularly in industrialization. These are inter-
connected interests which sometimes require an increase
in production above the limit we need to meet our finan-
cial requirements.^^
Saudi production and pricing policy thus remain structured
of factoring more inclusive than simply domestic revenue
requirements
.
Current Saudi policy makers argue that policy must, of
necessity, include consideration of consumer economies. They
theorize a linkage between energy costs and world inflation
and realize the Saudi Arabian impact upon such -- especially
as the world's leading exporter of crude. With vast foreign
investments and near total reliance upon imports for develop-
ment, Saudi Arabia has a direct interest in minimizing world
inflation. Sheikh Yamani stressed this linkage by noting:
"We know that if your economy (Western) collapses, we'll
collapse with you. Money in itself counts for nothing.
It only counts if it is put back into circulation and trans-
formed into industry, technology . "^ ^ Thus, the continued
attempts by Saudi Arabia to minimize OPEC price increases





There is a direct interest in OPEC too, for which
dovishness in pricing must be moderated. The oligopolitic
advantage of OPEC has been perhaps the single most signifi-
cant factor contributory to the increased oil revenues of
the 1970s. Thus, while Saudi policy within OPEC has been
one of moderation to the occasional point of confrontation,
it has never been carried to the extent of threatening the
stability of OPEC. Indeed, throughout the period 1977-1980,
Saudi Arabia entered each OPEC conference with well published
views, which very nearly approached demands, on the modera-
tion in oil pricing which it felt necessary for a successful
conference. And in each conference, Saudi Arabia initially
stood firm in its "demands." But in each case the end
result was a Saudi Arabian pricing and production policy which
had been amended to more nearly approach the broad consensus
of OPEC membership. The Saudi pricing remained the lowest
in the cartel but not so low as to jeopardize the cartel. ^^
World petroleum market stability is a concern shared with
the other members of OPEC with, perhaps, some reasoning
unique to the Saudi perspective.
With the majority of its economy dependent upon the oil
sector, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a position where the
major measures of performance of the internal economy are
dependent on external market events which influence the price
and demand for Saudi oil. A study by the International
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Institute for Strategic Studies noted that the sheer magni-
tude of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves "places the country in
a separate cate/gory."
She may be able to produce oil well into the twenty-
first century and possibly even into the twenty-second
. . . . Any further disruption of the international oil
market, therefore, would increase the danger of making
Saudi oil worthless [in the longer run] . For this
reason, the country cannot be interested in further
disturbances of supplies and price increases; a stable
relationship with consumer countries will serve her
interest best. ^°
Another Saudi Arabian concern for long-term prospects of her
oil potential must be in the area of continuing oil price
increase impact upon the "irreversible development of new
energy sources. "^^ The Saudis seek to strike a balance
between high oil prices, which reduce consumption and
increase investments and research in alternative energy
sources, and a need to maintain world interest in oil supplies
in order to complete Saudi development. Sheikh Yamani has
expressed fears of intensive research, spurred by high oil
prices, which would accelerate development of alternative
energy.
We are at a point in our development where we are in
a race with time. Our interest forces us to maintain
the life of our oil production long enough to build
our economy until we reach that period of time when
there is another major source of energy that can
replace oil. At that time we will shift to that
source as our main source of energy. We expect that
in the next century, at some point in its '20s or '30s




While stable pricing and production may seem an attribute
desirable of any economic market, it offers Saudi Arabia
special advantages. For in a stable market, Saudi Arabia's
relative prominence is maintained within the community of
oil exporting markets, whereas an unstable market offers the
opportunity for vast profiteering by the less prominent
members, thus enabling them to close the gap between their
financial status and that of Saudi Arabia. This is another
reason why Saudi Arabia has continuously offered production
levels higher than necessary under pure domestic consideration
And finally, the Saudis have always considered the impact
of energy costs upon development to the third world countries.
As a member of both the Islamic world and the developing
nations at large, and as a heavy investor in the world
economy, Saudi Arabia has a triple interest in the Third
World. The first two interests are in the form of aid,
assistance and leadership, and Saudi Arabia has played the
role well. As will be seen in a later section, she has been
active in both advocating north-south dialogue and of a more
direct nature -- financial assistance in the form of direct
grants, loans and special recycling programs for the less
developed countries.
Saudi Arabia's vast production capacity has been a
prime factor in its dominance both in world affairs and, of
a more direct nature, in OPEC. How much spare capacity
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actually exists has been widely rumored from as high as
20 mmbpd to as little as 12 mmbpd; however, it now appears
that the lower figure is the most likely. In 1977, the
government directed Aramco to take steps to ensure a maximum
sustainable lifting capacity to 16 mmbpd; however, those
projections were reduced in 1979 to 12 mmbpd.
C. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
The term "economic interests" covers a broad spectrum.
It is imperative then that the portion which this work
addresses be clearly delineated.
This section is divided into two sub-sections. The
first will discuss national interests in the realm of the
international monetary mechanism. For it is a smoothly
functioning and efficient monetary mechanism which provides
the financial framework and means for conducting the so-
called "real transactions" of international economics.
Real transactions embraces the exchange of goods and
services among countries and the movement of factors of
production from one country to another. The second sub-
section will cover national interests in the area of these
real transactions or commerce.
While .these two categorizations are generally applied
to international economic relations, one knows that international
economic relations have domestic economic linkages -- just
as foreign policy has domestic linkages. Each of these two
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categorizations will then include discussions of domestic
linkages
.
1 . International Monetary System
There has been much discussion, reaction, and alarm
to the vastly changed world economic order since the oil
price hikes of 1973-74. Much of it concentrates on the vast
surpluses in trade and current account balances of the OPEC
nations. These new-found funds resulted in greater absorp-
tion by all of them in goods and services, in some cases
sufficient to offset the momentary increase in current
account balances. However, a few have been unable to completely
absorb the surpluses even in spite of vastly increased
exchange of financial assets for real resource. These non-
absorbers thus remain with substantial investment assets
enabling more direct effect upon the world economy. In 1977,
the International Monetary Fund report summarized the situation
as one in which "the industrial countries have reduced their
national savings, so as to pay for their share of the oil
deficit; and national savings of the oil exporting countries
have displaced those of the industrial countries. . . ."^^
The chief non-absorbers are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates and, until the decline in production subse-
quent to the revolution, Iran.
With its vast production capacity and unequal
domestic revenue requirements, Saudi Arabia ranks chief
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among these newly arisen stimulators of the world economy.
Its decisions on oil production, imports, and investment
policy are more critical than those of but a few countries.
The IMF's decision of July 1978 to include the Saudi riyal
in the SDR basket of currencies and of September 1978 to
include Saudi Arabia as a sixth member of the IMF Executive
Board of Directors was symbolic recognition of Saudi Arabia's
growth to a position of world financial and economic
importance.^'* The specific reasons for the decision were
Saudi Arabia's role in world trade and international credit.
During the 1972-1976 SDR evaluation revision, Saudi exports
amounted to $116 billion or 2.81 of the world total and
Saudi Arabia rose to be the second largest international
creditor after the United States. ^^
Saudi Arabia's current account surpluses during the
period 1974-1977 were $79 billion. Deducting Saudi government
grants to less developed countries (LDCs) and official trans-
fers, there remained $65 billion at the end of 1977 repre-
senting net external assets. Of that amount, $33 billion
was classified by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)
as international reserves. At this level, Saudi reserves
were the second largest among IMF reserves. Only West
Germany exceeded that amount. ^^
However, 1978 proved to be a year of reversal due
to a combination of reduced oil revenue, world inflation
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and increased Saudi imports. The combination of such
liabilities caused a reduction in Saudi Arabia's current
account surplus, thus forestalling the vast increases that
so many had predicted in Saudi Arabia's net external assets.
While the full explanation has not yet had time to be
resolved, it caught many analysts off guard for, indeed,
the majority had felt that Saudi foreign assets would exceed
$100 billion by 1980.^^ As Table III-4 shows, they were
nearly $65 billion in 1979, slightly down from the 1977
figure and $72.1 billion in 1980, well below the $100 billion
mark.
While Saudi Arabia's prominence in the international
financial market is unquestionably of the United States
national interest, it is of even more direct national interest
to find where these vast financial assets are invested. The
greatest portions have been invested in industrial countries
with the United States drawing the largest share. By
mutual agreement, governments keep specific figures on country-
to-country investment highly confidential and will reveal
investment figures only in area or function aggregate
groupings -- such as OPEC or Middle East investment in the
United States. ^^ However, Morgan Guaranty Trust estimates
that Saudi Arabia has placed about three-quarters of its
external assets in dollar denominated assets and that, of
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The head o£ the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has
confirmed this by contending that Saudi holdings of U.S.
Government securities "constitute the single largest com-
ponent of their international reserves. "^° Likewise, Saudi
oil minister Sheikh Yamani confirmed in a speech at the
University of Riyadh in mid-1978 that "Most of our [foreign]
investments are in dollars. . . ."^^
Table III-5 depicts placement (or withdrawals) of
the Middle Eastern oil exporting countries into United
States investments during the period 1974 through the first
half of 1978. With Saudi Arabia representing, by far, the
largest non-absorber within the aggregate grouping, it is
estimated that by mid-1978, SAMA held $34 billion in dollars
of which $11 billion was in foreign banks. The remaining
$23 billion estimate was deemed to be held by a mixture of
U.S. government paper and bank deposits in U.S. banks.
Roughly 15 to 20% was deemed to be in short-term securities . ^^
In 1977, President Carter casually suggested that Saudi
Arabian investment in the United States may have been far
in excess of $35 billion. In toasting visiting Prince Fahd
during a White House dinner, the President remarked, "Saudi
Arabia has about $60 billion invested in our country. . . ."^^
Saudi Arabia thus holds a portion of significant United
States economic interest both as a director of the IMF








1974 1975 1976 1977
Treasury Bills
,
Bonds § Notes 2292 3301 4097 3718
Other Domestic
Bonds 885 1553 1179 1695
U.S.




1927 1134 1794 353
I
5466 7637 8879 7156
SOURCE: Treasury Bulletin (August 1978) and Treasury Inter
national Capital Movements report as cited in
Technology Transfer Subcommittee Hearings, p. 197
$ 398.
aspects have significant effect upon the dollar. Even though
Saudi net external assets are forecast to slow in growth
compared to the 1974-77 period, the 1980 estimates exceeded
$72 billion, thus maintaining Saudi Arabia's importance in
the international financial market and specifically in mainte-
nance of the United States exchange rate.^**
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While Saudi investment in the dollar has significant
potential effect upon the United States economy, its potential
should be moderated by a consideration of other foreign
investment in the United States. Indeed, the entire Middle
Eastern oil exporting countries' total U.S. investment is
large in absolute sense, but this represents a small portion
of the total U.S. capital market which is estimated on the
order of $3.3 trillion. Likewise, Middle Eastern holdings
account for: (1) less than 10% of all foreign holdings of
U.S. treasury securities; (2) less than 31 of total public
holdings of U.S. treasury securities; and (3) less than II
of outstanding dollar volume of U.S. corporate bonds and
securities . ^ ^
From a Saudi perspective, investment in the U.S.
dollar is based more upon international economic logic than
upon political, moral or ideological reasoning. The United
States represents the largest economy in the world --a
profitable outlet for the surplus funds generated by Saudi
oil revenue and one of the very few capital markets in the
world capable of absorbing such large sums. While they may
try to diversify outside the dollar, there is no other market
capable of handling the bulk of currency which they generate.
These investments will be a source of financing for future
development of their own country. In an interview with an
Arab reporter. Sheikh Yamani confirmed the Saudi view of
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Western investment as the only logical avenue for disposal
o£ Saudi revenue surpluses.
(The surplus) is increasing daily. There is no
avoiding investing this surplus in Western banks
because there are no other financial establishments
that can absorb it.^^
Income from investment alone represented an
estimated $4 billion in 1978, increasing to an estimated
$8 billion in 1980 -- both figures larger than the total
income of the kingdom in 1970.^^ The Saudi Arabian Govern-
ment has been explicit in detailing its investment policy.
They have stated that they seek to play a "constructive role,
recognizing the need to act with larger issues in mind than
solely profit" and that they have "sought to avoid sudden
or large scale shifts in assets, speculative transaction,
investment in the sensitive area of real estate and con-
trolling interests in U.S. firms." The head of SAMA has
further stated that investment managers in the United States
have been instructed that "at no time may Saudi government
investments reach 51 of the voting stock of any company. "^^
Saudi Arabian economic policy then is reflective of
the part which they play in the interdependence of world
economic order and, like other nation states, they perceive
a direct national interest in world order. Heir Apparent
Fahd expressed such a view in a 1977 interview.
We believe that world economic stability is the most
important pillar of world peace. . . . The spread of
international economic crises distracts efforts to
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achieve peace in the Middle East. Accordingly, when
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. . . decided on a 5 per-
cent increase in oil price against the 10 percent
recommendation of the other members of OPEC. . .
it was only taking into consideration the interests
of the international community and world stability
in the hope that peace would be returned to those
regions that have been deprived of peace and, most
importantly of course, to the Middle East. We are a
part of the world, and we see our oil interests linked
to the question of economic peace. ^^
It must also be noted at this point that the
preceding discussion regarding United States -Saudi Arabian
economic interests further confirms the linkage of consumer
economies in Saudi Arabian moderation in oil pricing. The
combined factors of substantial investment in dollars and
oil payments in dollars must be considered in any proposed
price increase. For there is inevitably a certain point at
which revenue incurred by oil price increases will be
negated by devalued investments and increased import costs.
2. Commercial Interests
The combined effects of massive internal development
within Saudi Arabia -- for which the country is almost
entirely dependent upon imports -- and vast oil revenue
have made the country of significance in international trade.
Total trade value of Saudi exports and imports within the
world markets has steadily risen from 0.91 in 1973 to 2.71
in 1977.**" Services included, total exports and imports
were valued at $79 billion in 1977.**^ This made Saudi Arabia
the ninth most lucrative trade market in the free world --
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ahead of industrialized nations such as Austria, Denmark,
Sweden and Switzerland.
With the second five-year development plan of $142
billion having just been completed and the third plan of
$237 billion for 1980-85 having just been initiated, the
country has been and will continue to be a major export
market for the world's industrialized countries. Saudi
imports of goods and services totaled $29.9 billion in 1977.'*^
An important and solid linkage of interdependence is struck
herein then, with Saudi Arabian imports offering an oppor-
tunity for industrialized nations to offset the trade
deficits incurred via the purchase of Saudi Arabian oil.
Saudi Arabia displaced France in 1978 as the seventh
largest market for United States exports'*^ and initial data
for 1980 show U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia valued at $5.8
billion. The total, including services, would be much higher
as Americans comprise a significant portion of the vast
expatriate labor in Saudi Arabia. United States market
share of Saudi merchandise imports steadily rose from 22.4%
in 1973 to 35.6% in 1976. However, the trend since 1976
has been a gradual loss of market share. This deterioration
is of even more significance considering that Saudi Arabia
is still an expanding market. The trend shown by Table III-6
is one which the United States can ill afford with net trade
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billion in 1980. In spite of this recent trend, the U.S.
remains Saudi Arabia's chief import supplier with Japan
following up at 15% market share.
The services market within Saudi Arabia represents an
area nearly as profitable for foreign suppliers as the merchan-
dise import market. Saudi Arabia spent $13.7 billion on
services in 1977 --a sum very nearly equal to total merchan-
dise import value for that year.**** However, the U.S. Anti-
Boycott Legislation and Tax Reform Act of 1976 have had
detrimental effects upon U.S. participation in this market.
The number of Americans employed by U.S. corporations in
Saudi Arabia has dropped from 651 of total employees in 1976
to 35% in 1980. And while U.S. contractors won some nine
percent in value of all construction contracts in 1975, today
their share is less than three percent. A Congressional
Study reported that because of U.S. tax reforms, it costs
a contractor 501 more to hire an American than a German,
Frenchman, or Australian.**^
From a Saudi Arabian perspective, the United States
is their largest supplier of imports. Since their vast
revenues enable complete freedom of choice, one may assume
the U.S. is their favorite market. The American product and
skill had the advantage of being first upon the scene in the
country and has been of wider familiarity and acceptance.
Further, the Saudis are particularly desirous of acquiring
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advanced technology to aid in development --an area in which
the United States excels.
Particularly lucrative technology requirements exist
in the fields o£ petroleum, water resources and manufacturing,
The opportunities are most obvious in the petrochemical in-
dustry and the United States leads the world in this field.
Saudi oil sector imports amounted to $322 million in 1976,
an increase of nearly 170% since 1972.**^ With current Saudi
water resources being supplied by non-renewable aquifers, the
long-term future for water resources appears to be in desali-
nation of sea water requiring high technology.**^
The area of commercial interests, therefore, offers
great mutuality. The United States provides the largest
portion of Saudi trade needs and therefore represents a
vital link in Saudi Arabia's goal of development, while Saudi
Arabia represents to the United States its seventh largest
export market and an opportunity to minimize the oil trade
deficit.
D. POLITICAL INTERESTS
There is strong mutuality of national political interests
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
represents to the United States a prominente within three
spheres -- Arab, Islamic and Third World nations -- each of
which the United States is vitally concerned with. Moreover,
each of these three spheres plays ever-increasing roles of
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importance in a world of rising multipolarity and
interdependence
.
To Saudi Arabia, the United States represents the arch-
defender in a world still possessing vestiges of bi-polarity.
The ideology of communism is abhorred by the Saudi Arabians,
for its atheism, its revolutionary basis and its socialism.
Thus, the United States represents the alternative force of
strength, that which has the capability of ultimate opposi-
tion to that which the Saudi Arabians abhor.
While Saudi Arabia began to exercise international inter-
course to a degree after World War II, the era of King Faisal
is perhaps a better point in history to mark as the turn from
semi-isolationism to active intercessor. Saudi Arabia was
a founding member of the Arab League in 1945 and attempted
to commit troops in the Arab- Israeli war of 1948. But the
troops never made it to the front because of transportation
problems and the "Arab cold war" which ensued after the free
officers coup in Egypt in 1952 forestalled any widespread
success for the Arab League.**^ Under Faisal's leadership,
the country seemed to have fully visualized the linkage
between internal security and external affairs. To this day,
foreign policy is very much primarily motivated by the per-




IKing Faisal's response to the radicalism espoused by
that which was bom of the free officers coup -- Nasserism --
was the precedent which is typical of Saudi Arabian policy
today. Moderation and conservatism was to be promoted and
those who practiced it were adjudged to be in Saudi favor.
However, the fervent appeal of Nasserism was to forestall
any Saudi Arabian preemption of regional Arab leadership
until 1967.
The setbacks suffered by the Arabs with Nasser as leader
in the 1967 war with Israel offered the opportunity for
Saudi Arabia to step forward and occupy a position of
regional leadership. King Faisal's broader based appeal
of Islamic unity -- versus Nasser's Arab nationalism --
combined with S,audi Arabia's financier status were the two
primary causes for Saudi Arabia's debut as regional prominente
The Arab confrontation states -- Egypt, Jordan and Syria --
had been left hard pressed after the war and Saudi Arabian
heavy financial aid -- along with several of the other oil
rich states -- proved to be the means for rebuilding. At the
Khartoum Conference in September 1967, Saudi Arabia and the
other oil-rich Arab states offered up $280 million for Egypt
and $100 million for Jordan as compensation for war losses. ^°
As the largest contributor, Saudi Arabia placed conditions
upon its offer which resulted in Nasser's withdrawal of
Egyptian forces which had been supporting revolutionaries
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Iin Yemen. Thus, if the Khartoum Conference represented
Saudi Arabia's debut as a regional actor of prominence, the
death of Gamal Nasser in 1970 represented a confirmation
of the new entrant's stature. Egypt still represented the
most powerful Arab regional actor but that power was in
large part sustained by Saudi Arabian financing. One report
states that between July 1974 and June 1975, Saudi Arabia
injected over $1.2 billion into the Egyptian economy. ^^
It is probably then more than mere coincidence that the
Saudi Arabian Defense Minister was in Cairo in July 1972
when President Anwar Sadat made his dramatic move to expel
all Soviet advisors from Egypt. Riyadh promptly dispatched
a military mission to Egypt which decided to help Egypt
extricate herself from Soviet political and military influence.
Such assistance included Saudi Arabian full financing of
Egypt's purchase of United States F-5 fighter aircraft.
Egypt's move toward the Camp David process, however, was
considered a move outside Arab unity and thus resulted in
foreclosure in most obvious Saudi Arabian aid projects.
The psychological successes of the oil boycott of 1973-74
and the vast surpluses resulting from the price increases
propelled Saudi Arabia from a mere regional role to a political
actor role of international consequence. Saudi Arabia was
then sought after as an international market, a financier
of both regional and international significance, a mediator
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of disputes, a source of energy and/or a voice of moderation
within OPEC pricing policy. Thus, the role of regional
actor which was effected late in 1967 was now expanded to
include the Islamic World, Third World and industrialized
nations
.
The role played by Saudi Arabia within the world of
Islam and Third World nations is very much like that played
as a regional leader. The Saudi Arabians' great influence
within the Islamic world is prompted by the combined histori-
cal facts of cultural heritage, possession of Islam's holiest
shrines and financial utility. The Saudi Arabians' Wahhabi
school of Islamic jurisprudence represents perhaps the most
orthodox within Islam. The responsibility entrusted by
possession of the holy places is one which the Saudi
Arabians have met with full resource. The transformation
of the annual pilgrimage in less than fifty years from an
arduous journey involving banditry and exploitation occurred
primarily because of the policy and effort of the Saudi
Arabian government . ^^
Financial resources provide a method of levering within
each of the spheres in which Saudi Arabia plays a role plus
opening opportunities outside the spheres. Aid, both grant
and loan, is given most heavily to members of the Arab and
Islamic spheres with the former receiving the predominant
portion. According to the Financial Times of London, $1.55
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billion was disbursed in 1977, $3.6 billion in 1976, $3.87
billion in 1975, and $2.37 billion in 1974. ^^ In 1978,
Saudi Arabia spent about 2.32^ of gross national product
(GNP) on foreign aid, compared with 4.3% the year before.
This is a significant drop but 2.321 is still far ahead of
industrial countries lending in percentage terms. If aid
performance were measured as a proportion of a country's
fixed assets, then Saudi Arabia would be still further ahead.
Armed with such figures, Saudi Arabia can exercise signifi-
cant political leverage within its spheres of influence. ^ **
Table III-7 shows the relative priority of Saudi Arabian aid.
Big Saudi Arabian aid recipients other than the Arab
confrontation states include Sudan, a friendly government
just across the ' Red Sea; North Yemen, a buffer against
Marxist South Yemen; and Pakistan, where moves toward a
more rigid Islamic law are viewed with favor. Non-Arab Africa
and Asia have also received Saudi Arabian aid but emphasis
remains strongly with Arab countries. The Saudi government
increased the grant element of its foreign loans from 461
of loans in 1976 to 51% in 1977 and 57% in 1978. Three-
quarters of those new grants committed in 1978 were to
Arab countries. In addition to these OECD publicized grants,
there are more discreet, direct government- to -government
grants between Saudi Arabia and "Israeli confrontation" states










Afghanistar^ 18-3 10 7-8 0-4
Bahraitf 1-7 01 1000 4-8
CameroutJfi 17-4 10 — —
Chadbc 1-7 01 01 0-005
Comoro Islands — — 2 1 01
Congo* — — 41 0-2
Egypt^ 948 9 53-3 496-8 24
Ethiopia** 10 01 — —
Gabon<= 10-4 0-6 — —
Guinea^ — — 0-2 001
Indonesia — — 6-9 0-3
Jordarfi 49-3 2-8 165-0 8-0
Malitx 160 0-9 — —
Mauntaniaf" — — 94-
1
4-5
Morocco^ 250 2-0 — —
j^igerbc 13-2 0-7 21 01
Omart^ 1000 4-6 — —
Pakistan 74-8 4-2 514-8 24-8
Rwanda** 50 0-3 — —
Senegal'^ — — 5-0 0-2
Somalia^ 17-2 10 22-8 1-2
Sudani 95-3 5-4 163-5 7-9
Syria' 242-2 13-6 189-8 91
Thailand — — 75-6 3-6
Togo* 20 0-1 11 05
Tunisia" 19-5 11 — —
Turkey 100 0-6 — —
Uganda'" 5-3 0-3 1 0-005





Arab States 1,603-9 1.453-8 70-1
Islamic states 1,772 99 6 1,990-8 96
Least developed states 269-2 15-1 418-4 20-2
African states 1, 187-5 66-9 789-9 38-2
Non-Arab African states 70-6 4 12-7 0-6
Afghanistan, India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh 93 1 5-2 522-8 25-2
Islamic states shown in italic " Arab state '' l.east developed <^ African state
Source: Arabia and the Gulf, 24 July 1978. a ^i«.^j ,-„ aj^^jAS Cited m Adeed
Dawisha, Saudi Arabia's Search for Security
(London: international institute for
Strategic Studies, 1979) p. 18.
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Saudi Arabia also stands as a supporter of Third World
developing nations by acting as a chief proponent for
North-South dialogue and establishing special petrodollar
recycling funds for Third World oil importers.
And lastly but certainly not least, two recent examples
have shown Saudi Arabia's international influence even
outside these spheres of special affinity. Canada reversed
a decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem
after being reminded of national economic interests in
Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom issued a diplomatic
apology when its national media carried a controversial
film on Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia also represents to the United States a
vital transducer of sorts within the overall goal of Arab-
Israeli conflict resolution. Herein lies the area in which
the two nations' interests are askew. Both seek the same
ultimate objective -- resolution of the conflict -- but each
nation sees a different path to the ultimate goal. The
United States represents the chief financier of the state
of Israel while Saudi Arabia is a leading financier of the
Palestinians.^^ This divergence of national interests has
existed from the earliest period of formal diplomatic rela-
tions between the two nations and has been overcome only
by the moderation and conservatism of the two. It should be
pointed out, however, that the United States-Saudi Arabian
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relationship is older than the United States- Israeli
relationship
.
As previously mentioned, ultimately the United States
represents to Saudi Arabia the arch-defender against
communism, the leading world advocate of the status quo
and the largest free world power within the vestiges of a
bi-polar world. However, in a more immediate interest, the
United States represents to Saudi Arabia the prime leverage,
short of hostilities, toward "Israeli intransigence in
Zionist expansionist policy." A former American ambassador to
Saudi Arabia reports that King Faisal saw specific linkages
between Zionism and communism. Although committed to American
friendship, Faisal believed that United States support of
Israel "opened up the entire Muslim world to Soviet penetra-
tion" and that such support was "an abberation" for America's
more important interests "lay in the Arab and Muslim World,
not in Israel. . . ."^^ There is little reason to think
that present Saudi Arabian views differ.
Thus, while seeking continued interests in the United
States, the Saudi Arabians can become exasperated by United
States' policy toward Israel. This gives rise to a faction
of opposition within Saudi Arabia very much opposed to current
policy regarding United States friendship and Soviet rejection.
Like that faction of opposition regarding oil policy (and
likely the same faction) , this group suggests that Saudi
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Arabian political alignment with the United States is more
to the country's detriment than good. While many signals
have occasionally been lit that Saudi Arabia may move toward
a more conciliatory status with the Soviet Union, none have
been fulfilled to date.^^
Thus, the most direct political interests that Saudi
Arabia has in the United States is inherent with problems.
For while most Saudi Arabians probably view the United
States as a primary stimulus upon Middle East regional
security and tranquility, the effect of the stimulus is
viewed in differing ways. Some may see the United States
as a required actor in any type of settlement while others
may see United States policy as the primary stimulus of
regional turmoil. Like the United States, Saudi Arabian




There exists within the military field a mutuality of
national interests also. Saudi Arabia has always been dependent
to a certain degree upon external sources for military security
assistance and Western governments, the United States paramount
among them, have been amenable in providing that assistance.
For each has viewed the security of Saudi Arabia as within
their own national interests. But like the relationship
as a whole, the events of 1973-74 have heightened the area
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of military interests in both, intensity of interest and
scope of complexity.
The British withdrawal from west of Suez, the Arab-
Israeli war of October 1973 and increased world oil demand
were each events of the era which served to propel the area
of military interests to a scale of greater intensity and
complexity. The British withdrawal represented the depar-
ture of a powerful overseer, leaving a sense of vulnerability
in the Persian Gulf region and, indeed, in the Western World.
That vulnerability was further heightened by the vast appre-
ciation of the area's oil resources within a world perceiving
oil shortages. There resulted thereafter a vast effort
within the area, aided and even prompted in large part by
the Western World, to increase inherent military capability.
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency cites the total
K value of military deliveries to the Middle East as increasing
from $4.6 billion in the period 1970-72 to $10.6 billion in
the succeeding three years. Oil-exporting countries such as
Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were particularly active in
developing military capability with their new-found revenues.
Saudi Arabia still faces problems which severely limit
its self-defense capability in spite of its vastly increased
financial capability to acquire the best in military training
and equipment. These problems, which are not likely to
change significantly over the next decade, are:
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(1) A large geographical area to defend --as large as
the United States east of the Mississippi River --
with an extended coastline -- over 2000 miles along the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
(2) A severely limited population base -- estimated
at five million -- from which to draw military
manpower.
(3) An untested and hence unproven military capability
outside the realm of small border disputes.
At first glance, a large geographical area suggests an
advantage of being able to trade space for time. But such
an attribute combined with a sparse population makes defense
of the entire geography nearly impossible. The most coveted
target for an enemy of Saudi Arabia would most likely be
the oil industry which is vulnerably concentrated within a
small area along the Persian Gulf coast. The destruction or
capture of the oil industry would mean the demise of Saudi
Arabia as a regional power of any consequence.^^ Saudi
Arabia's security problem of geography is, therefore,
dramatic.
Manpower problems are no less severe. Saudi Arabian
armed forces, like U.S. forces, are all volunteer. The
rapidly expanding private sector within Saudi Arabia has
offered competition, within an already limited market, for
manpower. It has thus become increasingly difficult for the
armed forces to meet manpower requirements. The Saudi
Arabian government has for quite some time considered
instituting a draft to remedy the situation but, to date.
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has not offered up any final decision.®" Thus, as a sort
of substitute for manpower, the Saudi Arabians are concen-
trating upon highly effective, mobile military defense hard-
ware. Emphasis is on manpower effectiveness.
The Saudi Arabian military capability is largely untested
While it is true that King Ibn Saud's unification of the
kingdom in the early part of the centry was due in large
part to his military might, it was the last significant test
of military effectiveness. The basis of Saudi Arabian
military structure since becoming a nation state has been
defense strategy. Ability beyond that strategy has thus
been weak to nonexistant. Support units were contributed to
the Palestine War of 1948 and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967
and 1973, but these actions were more symbolic than sub-
stantive. In two other cases, Saudi Arabian troops have
been rallied in defensive displays of strength -- 1957 in
Amman in a show of support for King Hussein against Syrian
threats and a 1961 massing on the Yemen border in a show
of support for royalist forces in Yemen. But, even one of
these, the Yemen case, required a deployment of United
States fighters to Saudi Arabia in support of the country's
territorial integrity.®^
The country's financial resources now enable it to
acquire the latest in defensive technology but there is some
question as to whether or not Saudi Arabia's technology
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absorptive capacity is equal to its financial capacity. The
past and present social, economic, and cultural isolation
from the rest of the world exceeds that of any other regional
state excepting Yemen and Oman. Thus, financial ability does
not necessarily include the ability to rapidly absorb the
human ability to operate them. A 1977 General Accounting
Office study, while supportive of arms sales to Saudi
Arabia as within the U.S. national interest, was critical
of the fact that there had been no assessment of Saudi
Arabian self-sufficiency in operating and maintaining its
arms . ^ ^
For all the reasons cited above and as shown quantitative
ly in Table III-8, Saudi Arabian military strength falls far
short of representing any regional military power. Those
powers which Saudi Arabia regards as threats include Israel,
Iran, Iraq and the Yemens . Israel has made repeated sug-
gestions that whereas Saudi Arabia was excluded from active
confrontation in past Arab-Israeli wars, any future Israeli
war strategy would have to include consideration of the Saudi
Arabian F-15s and the oil weapon. Such suggestions, along
with Israel's historical reliance upon pre-emptive strike
strategy, are sufficient grounds for regarding Israel as a
possible adversary in active conflict. ^^
Iran and Saudi Arabia represented -- until the fall of






































































































































































































































However, it was a wary, imbalanced partnership. There were
social, cultural, economic and military differences which
could never be reconciled. Moreover, Iran's seizure in 1971
of the Gulf islands Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tumbs
raised grave questions in Arab minds as to what purpose
Iranian power was destined. The present transition in Iran
has weakened the military power but such weakening may only
be a momentary product of the transition. Regardless, the
social, cultural and economic differences remain. Although
the Saudi Arabians do not espouse it publicly, there is
little doubt that they regard Khomeini Shiism as a threat
equal to any that existed under Iranian monarchial rule.
Iraq has, since its 1958 revolution, represented a
leftist, revolutionary oriented regime which, on occasion,
has been identified with activity to undermine Saudi Arabian
security. Moreover, its communist contacts and Soviet-
supplied military have caused apprehensive concern within
Saudi Arabia. Revolution in Iran and a perception of common
danger have now caused Saudi Arabia and Iraq to seek discreet
mutual ties. However, the collaboration is most likely much
like that of the "twin pillar" scheme under monarchial Iran -
a wary association full of apprehension regarding the
imbalance in military power and the contrasting doctrines
of Baathism versus traditionalism.
A consolidated North and South Yemen has long been a
prospect outside Saudi Arabia's interests. With perennial
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border conflict between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, a
consolidated Yemen would represent a~ potential power of
consequence. Moreover, with a Marxist government and communist-
supplied military in South Yemen, the threat takes on a
double-edge . ^ ** Saudi Arabia has long sought to influence
both countries through aid and to aid North Yemen in any-
military conflict with South Yemen. Results, however, have
been more momentary than representative of any long-term
realignment.
While the discussion heretofore has dealt with external
security, there is another aspect which must be mentioned and
that is internal security. For it is undoubtedly a common
interest of both the United States and the Saudi Arabian
government that there not be any radical reversal of the
status which presently exists therein. Former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger summarized this United States interest
in a London speech by saying that the fall of the House of
Saud would represent a "major blow to Western interests in
the Persian Gulf region. "^^
The threats to Saudi Arabian internal security are numerous.
A vast expatriate labor force comprising every nationality and
degree of fervor and emotion from American through Palestinian
to Yemeni is one; some estimate their numbers are such so to
comprise 16 to 40% of the native Saudi population. A religious
duty to maintain an open-door policy for two million annual
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pilgrims is another; many stay over in the country after
completing the pilgrimage and their political leanings
may prompt all sorts of problems from Khomeini Shiism to
Iranians and Iraqis trying to simultaneously complete the
pilgrimage while their two countries conduct war against
each other. Another possible threat to internal security
is the view taken by many Muslims of conflict between Islam
and all the vestiges of modernism; the kingdom's latest
manifestation of this threat occurred at Mecca during the
1979 pilgrimage. Add to each of these the vulnerability
of the kingdom's oil facilities to sabotage and disruption,
and one will see the importance of internal security within
the kingdom.
Saudi Arabian interests in the United States, therefore,
lie in the area of U.S. assistance in closing the gap
between military security requirements and military security
capability. Such assistance can be in the form of weapons
transfers, advising, administering, training, manpower
assistance and ultimately -- support by U.S. military forces.
Alfred L. Netherton, U.S. Department of State Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, confirmed the United
States' involvement in that interest in 1977 testimony before
Congress. He described arms sales to Saudi Arabia as
reflecting "U.S. interests in the security of Saudi Arabia
affirmed by every President since FDR. . . . Current [arms





."^^ The relationship was maintained by
$4.5 billion in arms sales in 1978, $6.0 billion in 1979 and
a projected $5.7 billion in 1980.^^ These arms sales are
administered by an in-country U.S. Military Assistance and
Advisory Group which, in 1978, was exceeded in size only by
those in Iran and South Korea. ^^ The total U.S. personnel
commitment to Saudi Arabia of 27,300 is made up of 700 diplo-
matic personnel, 2600 Department of Defense personnel and
24,000 private American citizens, each category including
dependents . ^° While many of the private U.S. citizens are
under contract to private commercial interests, a significant
number are involved in privately contracted defense techno-
logical support and training. The Northrop Corporation F-5
aircraft program and the Vinnell Corporation's involvement
in training of the National Guard are two current examples.
Assimilation of the recently purchased F-15 fighter aircraft
will be a future demand for manpower assistance.
U.S. Corps of Engineers involvement in security assistance
to Saudi Arabia represents botn a unique and highly successful
aspect of the program of U.S. assistance. There are 1450 U.S.
government employees devoted full-time to fulfillment of the
Corps program in Saudi Arabia, 950 within the kingdom (plus
1200 dependents) and the remainder in the U.S. In administer-
ing a program estimated at $20-25 billion in the next ten years,




U.S. Corps of Engineers Locations in Saudi Arabia
conps or enoinscrs
F-S AIR BASES
Source: U.S. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office,
Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia
,
A Report to
Congress, October 27, 1977, p. V.
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associates of Saudi Arabia (Yemen, Sudan and Oman) as to
the possibility of acquiring similar aid. The key probably
lies in whether or not the Saudi Arabians would be willing
to finance such programs. ^^
The ultimate Saudi Arabian military interest in the
United States of defense by U.S. military forces has been
evidenced on several occasions, both in an earlier period
of the relationship and more recently. It has already been
mentioned how U.S. fighter aircraft were deployed to Saudi
Arabia in 1962 in demonstration of United States' support
of Saudi Arabian territorial integrity. ^^ Similar acts
were taken in 1979 and 1980. In January 1979, a unit of
United States F-15s was deployed to Saudi Arabia in the wake
of the Iranian crisis; in March of the same year, two airborne
warning and control (AWAC) aircraft were deployed to Saudi
Arabia during a South Yemeni threat against North Yemen; and
in fall 1980, four AWACs were deployed to Saudi Arabia during
the Iraq- Iran war. While each act was publicized as "unarmed
aircraft," it was a clear message of United States commitment
to Saudi Arabian security. ^^
Unlike Saudi Arabian military interests in the United
States, United States military interests in Saudi Arabia are
not so formally structured or evidenced. To be sure, the
United States would welcome U.S. basing rights in Saudi Arabia
along with some form of defense alliance. The former justifi-
cation for basing rights in Dhahran would now have to be
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modernized only slightly to accommodate the so called
"Carter Doctrine" for protection of vital U.S. interests
in the Persian Gulf. But the same forces which caused
Saudi Arabia to abrogate the Dhahran agreement in 1961
exist today in even stronger proportions. The increased
threat represented by the Soviet move into Afghanistan has
still been insufficient to move Prince Fahd from the position
that his government would not grant the United States
"military bases or facilities" in Saudi Arabia.^** Likewise,
the Saudi Information Minister declared to his populace in
1980 that there were no foreign military bases in the
kingdom and that ther^ would never be any foreign military
bases in Saudi Arabia. ^^ Sovereignty, nationalism, non-
alignment and eschewal of any vestige of imperialism are
the accepted basis for international stance within the Arab
world. The United States, therefore, must look toward
countries who consider the losses to be incurred in extending
U.S. basing rights offset by other gains. Saudi Arabia is
not one of them. As William Quandt has noted, "Saudi
Arabian Arab and Islamic ties will often prevail over
relations with the U.S."^^
The present and continued United States involvement in
Saudi Arabian military affairs is, however, a vital U.S.
interest even if short of an ultimate aspiration of basing
rights. (And many, including this author, would argue as
to whether or not basing rights are in the utlimate interest
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of the United States or Saudi Arabia.) While the Saudi
Arabians publicly espouse Arab defense of their own interests,
there is little doubt that they would welcome or possibly
even expect U.S. aid in defense against an outside force.
Thus, the familiarity with locale, individuals and equipment,
and the standardization resultant from United States' involve-
ment in Saudi Arabian military security programs are vital
U.S. military interests in Saudi Arabia. The absence of
formal alliances and basing rights makes Saudi Arabia no
less of an American military interest. It is a characteristic
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A. PARADOX AND FORTUITOUS CIRCUMSTANCE
The beginning of the United States -Saudi Arabian
relationship is full of paradox and fortuitous circumstances.
Paradox was that one Middle Eastern state -- Saudi Arabia --
which had petroleum resources exceeding all others in the
area should look outside the bounds of the predominant
influence within the area -- British -- for association.
And that one of the predominant influence's prime purposes
for being in the area was to exploit the petroleum resources
of the area. Fortuitous circumstance was that the state --
Saudi Arabia -- should look to American sources for associ-
ation even though such association was not actively sought
by the United States Government. History suggests that such
a lack of activism on the part of the United States Government
may have been a prime motivation for Ibn Saud. To spurn
British influence and seek American associations was in
effect an avoidance of political ties with a foreign
government.
Paradox was the fact that several American oil companies
should turn down Karl Twitchell's offer of venture into what
was to be one of the world's largest petroleum reserves.
Fortuitous circumstance was the fact that Ibn Saud's personal
advisor, a British Arabist, should advise the King to consult
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an American, Charles Crane, on development of the kingdom's
resources and advise him to accept an American firm's offer
for concession over a British firm's. But here again, there
are some offerings for explanation for such in that some
claim Philby had an axe to grind with Britain.
B. THE CORNERSTONE: ARAMCO
With such a beginning in good fortune and paradox, one
might expect the history of such a long association to settle
down to be the resultant of planned, programmed action by
both associated governments. However, it did not. The
first decade of association was not self-initiated by the
United States Government but, rather, by the economic asso-
ciation between an Arabian king who needed revenue for his
newly consolidated kingdom and an American oil company with
vested interests in the kingdom. This economic linkage was
the sole basis of American- Saudi Arabian relationship for
ten years before the United States Government ever became
officially involved. Financial aid was relayed from the
United States Government to Ibn Saud in an indirect manner,
but this too was at the instigation of the American half of
the economic association -- Aramco. Thus, the United States-
Saudi Arabian relationship was not only birthed by Aramco
but the oil company acted as the sole resident guardian
of the relationship for the first ten years of its life.
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Aramco's part in this relationship deserves further
comment. There has been of recent much study of the effect
multinational corporations have upon international relations.
One theory sees the multinationals as a foreign policy tool
of the home country. The multinational injects home country
influence into foreign countries by penetrating national
borders. Such a description applies to Aramco. However, for
the first ten years, Aramco was not a mere tool of foreign
policy but rather a manipulator of foreign policy. Its role
subsided to the more common role of tool when diplomatic
relations were established with Saudi Arabia in 1943.
In that role, Aramco played an exceptional part. For
it was paradox that while other such tools of foreign policy
all around the region fractured in the stress of nationaliza-
tion, Aramco remained strong and useful. The company itself
deserves, perhaps, more of the credit than does United States
policy. For it was through exceptional personnel policies,
superior technical performance and conciliatory compromise
with the Saudi Arabians that the company came to be regarded
by Saudi Arabia as a national asset nearly as valuable as
the oil which it produced.
The role has now changed, however. The company now more
nearly fulfills the role of hostage to a host government. The
threats in 1973 of possible nationalization forced the company
to assume the new role in an effort to avoid huge capital
losses and complete loss of interest in Saudi Arabian
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petroleum reserves. The 60% assumption of ownership by the
Saudi Arabian Government weakened the company's role as a
tool of foreign policy and the completion of present nego-
tiations regarding complete Saudi Arabian ownership will
nearly destroy the tool. The final result may be something
betwixt and between. Aramco will be somewhat of a hostage
to Saudi Arabia in that she will have a vested interest in
maintaining the production service and marketing of Saudi
Arabian oil. However, Saudi Arabia also will have a vested
interest in retaining the experience and superior technical
ability of the company and its former owners, thus making
the company a possible tool of foreign policy for the United
States -- albeit a very weak one.
C. 19 73 -- A YEAR OF CHANGE
The relationship between the United States Government
and Saudi Arabia changed -- like the role played by Aramco -
in 1973. Before that Saudi Arabia had been somewhat of a
little brother of big brother United States. The younger
brother admired the stature, accomplishments, products,
skill and strength of the bigger brother. Dependency was
rather one-sided, the younger looking toward the older for
assistance and guidance. However, under the leadership of
Faisal, the younger brother began to grow and mature,
seeking individual reasoning rather than dependency upon
the older brother. The momentum of change began with Faisal
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in the latter half of the 1960s and the climax was reached
in 1973.
The relationship between the two nations is now one
more of interdependency. Saudi Arabia's mineral resources
and revenues therefrom have made her more of an independent
actor. No longer dependent upon external sources for financial
aid, she can shop the markets for the best purchases in
developmental aid, arms and military training. As a political
actor of significance, she is no longer dependent on any
outside power for day-to-day political clout. While all
national sovereignty is relative, Saudi Arabia's post-1973
international sovereignty is far greater than any which
existed prior to that time.
D. CONGRUENCY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS
In reviewing the national interests by which the rela-
tioship is maintained, oil remains paramount. It was oil
which served to birth the relationship, it was oil which
served to develop the relationship and it was oil which
served to refocus the relationship in 1973. Each of the
other interests sustaining the relationship is itself
either enabled or heightened in importance by oil.
Such a situation has been enabled by the mutually
reinforcing interests of each member. For Saudi Arabia,
the oil industry represents the heart of the nation. Without
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of the GDP. For the United States, Saudi Arabian oil repre-
sents an important energy source for itself and, even more
important, for its Western European and Japanese allies. In
the latter half of the decade of the 70s, Saudi Arabian oil
supplied approximately seven percent of United States crude
requirements, 251 for Western Europe and 351 for Japan.
Such figures demonstrate clearly the heightened vitality
of Saudi Arabian oil to the United States and more so to
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its allies. The exchange of oil is then a vital mutual
interest between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The process of actually producing the oil is also a
mutually reinforcing interest. For whereas the United
States has the best supply of technology, manpower and
equipment for oil production, Saudi Arabia has the need.
There were still 13,000 Americans working for Aramco in
1980 in spite of the Saudi takeover.
The national interest of economics is also mutually
reinforcing. In international monetary affairs, the
United States represents to Saudi Arabia the largest
economy in the world. Thus there is no avoiding the
significance of the dollar, necessitating Saudi support
for a strong dollar. And for the United States, there is
no avoidance of the possible effect the vast Saudi revenue
excesses can have upon the dollar. Pursuit of long-term
individual interests by both partners in the relationship
should therefore further serve to strengthen the relationship.
That other aspect of the economic interest, trade and
commerce, is also mutually reinforcing. Saudi Arabia is
currently undertaking a pace of national development never
before precedented in history. Within that plan, she has
utilized the United States as her primary source of technology,
real goods, and services. Thus what Saudi Arabia sees as a
primary source of means for development, represents to the
United States a vital means of offsetting the significant
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debt incurred in purchasing Saudi oil. Thus the process of
"dollar recycling" is of mutual interest to both nations.
The military interests of the two members, excepting
the case of Israel, are mutually reinforcing also. While
this study has dealt primarily with events radially emanating
from the central focus year of 1973, it must be mentioned
that the year 1979 plays a role of prominence within the
military field. The Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan
of that year served to prompt the United States to boldly
declare its military interests in the Persian Gulf region.
It also served to redefine the Soviet Union as an interna-
tional transgressor to most international actors who had
recently considered her otherwise. Those who had been con-
sidering some sort of approachment with the Soviets abandoned
their efforts thereafter. Another event of 1979, the
Iranian revolution also served to heighten the importance
of mutual interests between the United States and Saudi
Arabia. For after Iran, Saudi Arabia was the only survivor
of the "twin pillar" policy for Persian Gulf security. These
two events them prompted the U.S. administration to take a
quantum leap in military assistance offerings to Saudi
Arabia, thus confirming her increased importance in the region,
Saudi Arabia, impressed likewise by the events of 1979,
welcomed such offerings but her view of the threat priority
is somewhat different from the United States'. While the
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United States views the threat as from outside the region,
the Saudis consider regional and internal threats as the
paramount source of disruption. The differing views
have served then a multitude of actions and arguments.
United States factions can justify increased military
cooperation with Saudi Arabia while focusing upon the inter-
national issues while their detractors can argue against
security assistance by focusing upon Middle East regional and
Saudi Arabian internal issues. Similarly, one Saudi faction
can justify increased military cooperation with the United
States by citing Soviet actions while another faction can
argue against such by noting United States regional policy.
Overall, however, the military interests can be adjudged
mutually supportive although lacking in the degree of mutuality
that exists in oil and economics.
Geostrategic interests are somewhat one-sided. As a
super-power, the United States has a strong geostrategic
interest in Saudi Arabia. That interest is primarily in
assuring that no unfriendly power gains control over the
area or strategic points within. The region represents a
geostrategic prize mainly to one of the two principal super-
powers. Saudi Arabia, as a non-super-power, does not there-
fore share that interest to the extent of United States concern,
She would not welcome control of the area by unfriendly forces.
But the demands of nationalism prevent her from expressing
strong outward allegiance to a friendly super-power protector
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in order to stave off an opposing super-power influence.
She is forced then to maintain a position of non-alliance
within a multi-bipolar world forestalling that day when a
move toward either pole may be necessitated. Because of
these concerns, the mutuality of this interest is then
scored neutral.
The area of political interests ranges the spectrum from
congruency to conflict. The United States represents to
Saudi Arabia the leader of the free world and the successful
example of free enterprise. In contrast, Saudi Arabia
represents to the United States an important lever within
regional, Arab, Islamic and Third World politics. From some
of these aspects the political interests are basically
congruent. But as was so clearly demonstrated in 1973, the
political interests of the two nations can turn to direct
conflict over the issue of another nation-state -- Israel.
This area then will require particularly adroit handling
by the two partners to avoid conflict in the future.
E. THE FUTURE
The future of the relationship lies primarily within the
same area from which the relationship evolved. It was oil
which established the relationship in the beginning, it was
oil which served to re-focus the relationship in 1973, and
oil remains the principal medium by which a "special relation-
ship" is carried out. It is oil then which will serve as the
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principal indicator for the future of the relationship. For
changes in that indicator would serve as the catalyst for
change in the relationship.
The possibilities of change are numerous. On the
demand side, a reduced dependence on Saudi Arabian oil would
obviously serve to weaken the United States interest in the
relationship. Such a reduced dependence could come about
by many different ways, from simple conservation efforts to
development of a better, more economical energy alternative.
However, it must be pointed out that reduced dependence would
have to be within the full axis of United States/Western
European/Japanese consumption. For as has been seen, a
major portion of the United States interest in Saudi Arabian
oil is as a lifeblood for the Japanese and European allies.
From the supply side, any factor which prompted reduced
supply or unreasonable prices would likewise weaken the
relationship. Stimuli for such could range from a new
Saudi Arabian government oil policy to destruction of the
oil facilities by war or sabotage. A new government policy
could simply result from a change in the present government's
policy, prompted by regional concerns and specifically United
States Middle East regional policy or by change in the
government itself. War or sabotage in the oil fields could
result from either an Arab-Israeli war, an inter-Arab war
or a revolution. It is to be assumed, of course, that the
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Western nations would work to prevent such occurrences.
Any such occurrence would seriously jeopardize their vital
interests, just as it would jeopardize the vital interest
of the present Saudi Arabian government.
The specific future of the United States -Saudi Arabian
relationship remains then like the future itself -- unknown.
But like other areas of international relations, the paradigm
or hypothesis of the future relationship may best be derived
by analyzing the past. This work has done that and it can be
seen that the best indicator to be used in the paradigm of
the future is the indicator of oil; herein lies the future
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